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Forthcoming in Indiana Law Journal 
Patrick Goold 
 
Abstract 
 
Accidental infringement of patent rights is a pervasive and growing problem in the Information 
Age. As IP rights proliferate and expand in scope, it is becoming increasingly easy for companies 
and individuals to inadvertently infringe patents. When such accidental infringement occurs, 
patent law holds the infringer strictly liable. This contrasts with many areas of tort law where 
defendants are only liable if they act negligently.  
 
This Article questions the normative desirability of strict liability in patent infringement cases. 
Assuming the primary value of patent law is utilitarian, the Article poses the research question: 
What liability rule  will maximize social welfare? The Article answers the question theoretically 
by applying economic models of accidents developed in tort law literature. The research finds 
that a negligence rule is preferable. Unlike strict liability, negligence liability will encourage both 
patentees and technology users to take reasonable measures to prevent accidental 
infringement, and thus minimize the social cost of patent accidents. Therefore, the Article 
recommends reforms to the liability rule in direct patent infringement cases. Defendants should 
be liable for accidental patent infringement only when they fail to adopt reasonable care to avoid 
the infringement.  
 
 
I.   Introduction ........................................................................................ 4 
II.  Patent Accidents ................................................................................. 7 
A. The Anatomy of Patent Accidents .................................................. 7 
B. The Causes of Patent Accidents .................................................... 11 
C. Literature Review .......................................................................... 13 
1. Strict Liability Proposals...................................................... 13 
2. Independent Invention Proposals ......................................... 15 
3. Negligence Proposals ........................................................... 16 
III.  The Case for Negligence ................................................................. 18 
A. The Social Cost of Patent Accidents ............................................. 18 
1. Accident Costs ..................................................................... 18 
2. Precaution Costs................................................................... 19 
3. Minimizing the Total Costs ................................................. 20 
B. Liability Rules Compared: Primary Considerations ..................... 23 
1. No Liability .......................................................................... 23 
2. Strict Liability ...................................................................... 24 
3. Negligence ........................................................................... 25 
C. Liability Rues Compared: Secondary Considerations .................. 27 
1. Activity Levels ..................................................................... 27 
2. Administrative Cost ............................................................. 30 
3. Error Cost ............................................................................. 31 
4. Externalities ......................................................................... 32 
D. Summary ....................................................................................... 34 
                                               
 Patrick R. Goold, Lecturer in Law, The City Law School. The author would like to thank BJ Ard, Oren 
Bracha, Tun Jen Chiang, Yotam Kaplan, Oskar Liivak, Henry Smith for comments on the Article. The 
author would also like to thank Michael Meurer, Jim Balsillie, Sean Silcoff, Terry J. Zakreski QC, for 
helpful discussions on the topic. Special gratitude is owed to Oskar Liivak who initially coined the term 
“Patent Accidents”. All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the author. Copyright in the work is 
retained by the author. 
2019/05 
 
4 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
IV.  Implementing Negligence ............................................................... 36 
A. Existing Legal Regimes ................................................................ 36 
1. U.S. Patent Act ..................................................................... 36 
2. U.K. Patent Act .................................................................... 38 
B. A Patent Negligence Defense ........................................................ 39 
C. Illustrative Applications ................................................................ 42 
1. NTP v RIM: Patent Thickets and Patent Trolls .................... 42 
2. Rambus v Infineon: Strategic Behavior................................ 44 
3. Monstanto v Schmeiser: Self-Replicating Technologies ..... 45 
V. Conclusion ........................................................................................ 46 
 
  
 I.   Introduction 
 
In 1999, Canadian company, Research in Motion (RIM), launched the Blackberry email 
pager.1 The pager was an instant commercial success amongst businesspeople and politicians 
alike. Behind the Blackberry’s success was its wireless email technology. No longer were emails 
confined to the desktop but were now easily accessible on-the-go. The technology for which had 
been invented by RIM founder Mike Lazaridis in the mid-1990s; or so Lazaridis thought. The 
following year, RIM received a letter from a small Virginia-based company called NTP.2 The 
letter alleged that the Blackberry infringed patents NTP held covering wireless technology that 
an engineer, Thomas Campana, had invented in the mid-1980s. This infringement letter came as 
a shock to RIM. Only a few months earlier RIM had received its own US patent on Blackberry’s 
email technology.3 As far as RIM was concerned they had created the technology and had the 
patent to prove it! Yet NTP won their infringement case in Virginia, securing an injunction that 
threatened to bring the production of Blackberries to a halt.4 To avoid a complete shutdown, RIM 
ultimately paid NTP an exorbitant license fee of $612.5 million in 2006.5 But should RIM have 
been held responsible for this patent infringement? Ought we to hold companies liable for 
infringing patents of which they were unaware and could not reasonably have been expected to 
know about? In most areas of civil law one is only liable for such accidents if one has behaved 
negligently.6 Run a pedestrian over in your car and you will only be accountable if you failed to 
take the care of a reasonable person. But infringe a patent accidentally and you are liable even if 
you behaved exactly as society would expect. Why is patent law the exception? 
Accidental patent infringement is a pervasive and growing problem. Property rights in 
tangible property can only be infringed by a limited number of individuals who are in close 
physical proximity to the tangible good. By contrast, due to the nature of intangibles, patents can 
be infringed by multiple people regardless of their location. Furthermore, unlike physical goods, 
with readily ascertainable boundaries, the scope of patent boundaries is unpredictable. Ideally a 
nation’s patent register ought to give the public a clear picture of what is, and what is not, subject 
to a patent. But patent law literature already provides evidence of a number of barriers and 
obstacles which prevent registers performing this function as well as we would hope.7 As a result, 
it is all too easy for even a diligent company to become an accidental infringer, and the amount 
                                               
 
1 See JACQUIE MCNISH & SEAN SILCOFF, LOSING THE SIGNAL: THE UNTOLD STORY BEHIND THE EXTRAORDINARY 
RISE AND SPECTACULAR FALL OF BLACKBERRY 67-78 (2018). Later, in 2002/3, the Blackberry would evolve into 
the more famous mobile cell phone.  
2 Id. at 123. 
3 Id. See also Pager Maker Gets Patent for E-Mail Delivery, WALL. ST. J. (May 18, 2001).  
4 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Va. 2003). 
5 ‘RIM's Sensible Patent Payout Keeps BlackBerry Users Hooked’, WALL ST. J. (March 6, 2006) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114160357490989930. 
6 2 DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 437, at 842 (2011); JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. 
ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: TORTS 265-66 (2010) (strict liability exists at “the margins 
of tort,” and is applicable in “a few special situations”). 
7 See infra Part II.B. 
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of such infringement is worrisome. Scholars of patent law today describe the problem of 
inadvertent patent infringement as “significant” and “getting worse”.8 Recent empirical evidence 
hints that perhaps as much as 89% of litigated patent infringements are unintentional and 
inadvertent.9 Buy a wireless router to use in your small business, and you may unknowingly be 
using technology that was not licensed by the proprietor; incorporate Bluetooth technology into 
a new cellphone after searching the patent register, and you may be inadvertently manufacturing 
a technology whose patent information was buried under a mountain of similar patents; grow 
crops on your farm and you may later find such crops germinated from patented seeds which were 
blown by the wind from nearby farm land.  
This Article questions the role of strict liability in accidental infringement cases. This is 
not an uncontroversial question; the strict liability standard in patent law is hotly debated.10 Those 
in favor of a strict liability standard have argued that a fault-based liability rule would be too 
administratively costly to implement, that such a rule may in fact harm the diffusion of new ideas 
in research environments, and that strict liability is necessary to ensure the patent holder’s 
incentives. On the other end of the spectrum, some argue that patent law ought to include an 
“independent invention” defense, under which no liability would attach to making, using, or 
selling a patented technology if the defendant has independently re-created the patented 
technology. Commentators who propose this rule argue that strict liability for those who 
independently invent technology impedes research and development, and leads to higher patent 
litigation costs. Some scholars, such as Chiang,11 and Blair and Cotter,12 fall somewhere in the 
middle of these two poles; it is on their work that this present Article builds.13  
Assuming the primary justification for patent rights is utilitarian, this Article provides a 
theoretical economic analysis of accidental patent infringement.14 Patent scholars have already 
argued that transaction costs prevent technology users and patentees from ex ante bargaining in 
cases of patent accidents, and that these cases should be governed by a liability rule rather than a 
property rule.15 By asking what type of liability rule is most appropriate (strict liability or 
negligence), this Article extends that analysis one step further. Following models developed in 
the economics of accidents literature,16 the Article determines which liability rule will reduce the 
total cost society spends on accidental patent infringement. The Article concludes that a 
negligence rule best fulfils this goal. Under a strict liability rule, technology users will adopt 
reasonable care to avoid accidentally incurring liability, but the patentee’s incentives to avoid 
such accidents (e.g. through providing appropriate notice of their rights) is less than optimal. By 
contrast, a negligence rule is preferable because it creates incentives for both technology users 
and patentees to adopt reasonable, cost-justified, care to avoid accidents. As a result, the number 
of patent accidents is reduced, saving society’s resources. More difficult is the question: Which 
version of a negligence rule will best achieve this goal? While both a simple negligence rule and 
a contributory negligence rule could feasibly improve social welfare, the Article presents various 
reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule.17 
                                               
8 JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT 
INNOVATORS AT RISK 47 (2009). 
9 Christopher A. Cotriopia &  Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421 (2009). 
10 See infra Part II.C. 
11 Tun-Jen Chiang, The Reciprocity of Search, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2015). 
12 Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and its Alternatives in Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 
799 (2002). 
13 See also Oskar Liivak, Negligent Innovation (forthcoming). 
14 See infra Part III. 
15 Mark A. Lemley, & Philip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules Govern Information? 85 TEX. L. REV. 
783 (2007) (following the theoretical framework in Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972)). BJ Ard has further argued 
that property law adopts less property rues than IP lawyers commonly appreciate and that IP should likewise shift 
to a more liability rule regime. See BJ Ard, More Property Rules than Property: Revisiting the Right to Exclude in 
IP, 68 EMORY L.J. 685 (2019). 
16 See infra Part III. 
17 The article does also find, however, the case for negligence in patent law is weaker than in copyright law, due 
to the existence of mandatory registration in the former but not the latter. See Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, 
Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025 (2016). 
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To implement such a liability rule, the Article recommends that patent law adopt a “patent 
negligence” defense.18 In accident cases, a user ought to avoid liability by proving that she 
adopted all reasonable care to prevent any accidental patent infringement. Reasonable care may 
include performing a diligent search of the patent register, inspecting relevant products for patent 
information, or reviewing the patent portfolios of competitor companies, for example. 
Implementing such a reform would involve a modest change to judicial practice. Indeed, United 
Kingdom courts already adopt a “quasi-negligence” rule by denying damages in cases where the 
defendants did not know of the patent and had no “reasonable grounds” for supposing such a 
patent existed.19 In such cases, courts should also use their equitable discretion to deny injunctive 
relief. In the U.S., under Section 287 of the Patent Act, courts deny damages in cases where the 
patentee has failed to appropriately mark patented products.20 As will be seen, this current rule 
imperfectly approximates a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence 
defense.21 However, rather than focus on the patentee’s level of care, this Article recommends 
instead that courts focus on the user’s level of care, and deny damages and injunctions when the 
technology user has taken all reasonable measures to avoid the infringement occurring. This 
modification is not only well within the judiciary’s authority but would also provide a satisfactory 
middle-ground between proposals to retain the strict liability standard and proposals to adopt an 
independent invention defense.  
Adopting such a modification has the potential to alleviate many problems in the 
contemporary patent system.22 In particular, the proposal would help curb abusive behavior of 
non-practicing entities (or patent “trolls”). Currently, non-practicing entities can pray on the 
inadvertent infringer: by sending a cease and desist letter, the troll can threaten to shut down small 
businesses who accidentally infringe the patent.23 The patent negligence defense, by contrast, 
would provide a powerful tool for small businesses in fighting patent troll behavior. Businesses 
will be able insulate themselves from litigation claims from trolls by taking steps that a reasonable 
company would in order to prevent any accidental infringement; leaving only those who behave 
negligently to fight such claims in court. Furthermore, a negligence rule would provide patentees 
with incentives to write clearer patent claims, and thus help address the contemporary concern 
that the patent system encourages patentees to strategically word claims in ambiguous ways to 
receive expanded protection.  
At this point, some may object: Will eliminating strict liability in accident cases depress 
incentives for innovation, thus harming society in the future? To which the Article responds: 
adopting a negligence rule may in some instances cause economic harm to the patentee, but 
society as a whole will benefit. In 1970, Guido Calabresi famously demonstrated that the optimal 
level of personal injury accidents in tort law was not, contrary to public opinion, zero.24  Road 
traffic accidents, in particular, cause severe harm to individuals and broader society. However, 
adopting measures to prevent those accidents is also costly. In many cases, the cost of the 
measures required to prevent accidents would be greater than the expected harm caused by the 
accidents themselves.25 As a result, society makes a choice to tolerate some road traffic accidents 
because it is better for society as a whole. Our goal is not to eliminate all accidents, but instead 
encourage parties to invest reasonable, cost-justified, levels of resources into accident-
avoidance.26 The same is true of patent infringement today. Accidental infringement of patent 
rights harms the patentee and in turn future society. However, the measures required to prevent 
accidental infringement can at times be onerous. In some cases, where the chances of an accident 
                                               
18 See Infra Part IV.B. 
19 See Infra Part IV.A. 
20 35 U.S.C. §287.  
21 See Infra Part IV.A. 
22 Id. 
23 Reitzig et al, On Sharks, Trolls, and their Patent Prey – Unrealistic damage awards for firms’ strategies of 
“being infringed” 36 RESEARCH POLICY 134 (2007) (“the even greater concern of today’s leading R&D 
multilaterals of potentially overlooking these (often small) inventors’ patents and being caught in the trap of 
inadvertent infringement.”) 
24 GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 17-24 (1970). 
25 Id.  
26 Id.  
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are slim but the costs of avoidance are high, society would be economically better off by simply 
letting the accident happen, rather than investing inefficiently in avoidance mechanisms. As 
explored in this Article, a negligence rule achieves this delicate balancing goal. 
The Article continues in three Parts. Part II defines accidental infringement of patents and 
offers a number of illustrations. This Part explains in more detail the causes of such accidental 
infringements and summarizes the literature on the optimal liability rule in patent law. Part III 
applies economic theory of accidents to the issue of patent accidents. The analysis reveals the 
case for some version of a negligence liability rule. Part IV discusses how best to implement a 
negligence rule and applies the suggested rule to demonstrate how such a law would solve a 
number of contemporary patent problems. Due to space considerations, Part IV provides reform 
recommendations in relation to the U.S. and U.K. law only, with the expectation that lawyers in 
other jurisdictions will translate these recommendations into their own domestic laws. Part V 
briefly concludes. 
 II.  Patent Accidents 
Anglo-American patent law holds all infringers strictly liable.27 Since the 19th century, 
courts have imposed liability upon anyone who makes, uses, or sells a patented invention, 
regardless of whether the defendant’s infringement was committed intentionally, negligently, or 
entirely innocently.28 This stands in contrast to many areas of civil law where a defendant is only 
accountable for unintentional injuries if she failed to take reasonable care.29 Yet, as this Part 
demonstrates, accidental infringement of patents is all too common. Section A describes 
accidental infringement of patents in greater detail. Section B discusses some of the main causes 
of patent accidents. Section C reviews the academic literature debating whether patent liability 
ought to be imposed strictly or whether some form of a fault standard should be introduced.  
A.  The Anatomy of Patent Accidents 
Broadly speaking, patent infringement can be divided into two types: intentional and 
accidental. For the purposes of this Article, patent infringement is “intentional” when, prior to the 
infringement, the defendant was aware that her planned course of action would involve patent 
infringement but nevertheless engaged in such conduct; for example, if A owns a patent on a new 
type of mousetrap, and B knowingly sells copies of the mousetrap in order to undercut A in the 
market.30 Like all forms of intentional tort, determining whether the wrongdoing is intentional 
                                               
27 For an alternative interpretation see Saurabh Vishnubhakat, An Intentional Tort Theory of Patents, 68 FLA. L. 
REV. 572 (2016) (arguing that patent infringement requires intentional conduct). Cf Patrick R. Goold, Intent in 
Patent Infringement, 68 FLA. L. REV. F 72 (2017) (arguing that intentional conduct, in both trespass and patent 
infringement, is not a fault standard). For a related discussion of “objective” fault standards in the area of indirect 
patent infringement, see Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 
1575 (2011). 
28 Hogg v. Emerson, 52 U.S. 587. 607-08 (1850) (“The intent not to infringe…never exonerates…from all damage 
for the actual injury or encroachment, though it may mitigate them.”); ALBERT H. WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE 
PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA §337, AT 292 (1883) (“To constitute an infringement of a 
patent, it is not necessary that the infringer should have known of the existence of the patent at the time he 
infringed it; or, knowing of its existence, it is not necessary that he should have known his doings to constitute an 
infringement.”). See generally Lynda J. Oswald, The Strict Liability of Direct Patent Infringement, 19 VA. J. ENT. 
& TECH L. 993, 999-1005 (2017). 
29 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 6.  
30 The concept of “intent” in patent law, as in law and philosophy generally, is debated. Peter Cane describes the 
concept of intent as being used “loosely” in tort law, sometimes used to refer to voluntariness, sometimes used to 
refer to describe motive, see Peter Cane, Mens Rea in Tort Law, 20 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 533, 555 (2000). 
Nevertheless, the use of “intent” in this article is relatively definite. As used here, the term intent is used 
synonymously with the use of “willfulness” when assessing patent damages, see generally Matthew D. Powers, 
The Evolution and Impact of the Doctrine of Wilful Patent Infringement, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (2001). Thus, 
intentional patent infringement, as used here, involves some element of mens rea in the literal sense of a guilty or 
blameworthy mental state. As a result, simply performing some conduct deliberately which later turns out to be a 
patent infringement, but without awareness of the wrongfulness of the conduct at the time of acting, is not regarded 
as intentional here (and accordingly this article’s use of intent is not to be confused with that in Vishnubhakat, 
supra note 27). However, this Article is not a work of conceptual analysis, and I do not claim this is the only or in 
some sense “right” understanding of intent in patent law. The intentional-accidental divide the article draws is used 
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requires, in theory, an understanding of the defendant’s subjective state of mind.31 However, as it 
is difficult to accurately discern the content of a defendant’s mental state, in common judicial 
practice, intent is typically inferred from more objective factors which serve as suitable proxies. 
32 Courts routinely find patent infringement was intended by examining the probabilistic 
relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the likelihood of infringement: if prior to 
commencing the conduct, there was a near certainty that such conduct would involve a patent 
infringement, courts are likely to find patent infringement was intended.33  
Equally, however, patent infringement may be accidental. Frequently in social life, 
individuals engage in activities which are overall beneficial for society, but which, as a by-
product, pose a risk of harm to others around us. At the time the individual engages in the relevant 
conduct, it is far from certain that the conduct will harm someone else, although it is surely 
possible. Sometimes that risk materializes into a reality and causes harm to others, even though 
that is not our desire or intention.34 A classic example is driving automobiles: on balance this 
activity is beneficial, although it does impose risk of harm on others. Sometimes those risks 
materialize and individuals are injured, although that was an outcome that no one wished to occur. 
The same situation occurs frequently in patent law. The process of innovation is socially 
beneficial, but it comes with risks attached: every time an inventor creates or commercializes a 
product or process, there is a risk that doing so might infringe the patent rights of an earlier 
inventor. As we shall see in the following examples, sometimes that risk materializes and patent 
infringements occur, although that was clearly not the desire of any party. Given the choice, both 
parties would have tried to avoid this unfortunate outcome. These cases in turn pose an important 
and thorny policy question: who should bear the cost of the accident: the innocent patentee? Or 
the innocent user who did not wish for this outcome to happen? Should the harm lie where it falls? 
Or ought we use the law to shift the responsibility to the user?  
Accidental infringement takes a number of forms. These can be grouped into three broad 
categories. The most basic form of accidental infringement occurs when the user of the patented 
invention is aware that he or she is using some form of technology, but is unaware of the existence 
of a patent. Perhaps the most discussed example of this occurring is the NTP v RIM case, described 
in the introduction.35 In this case, RIM was engaged in a beneficial activity: inventing new types 
of pagers and cellphones that allowed individuals to receive emails wirelessly.36 When they 
started this activity, RIM was, or at the very least ought to have been, aware that such technical 
activity could possibly infringe the patents of a prior inventor. Ultimately, this risk materialized 
and a patent infringement did result. However, this was clearly not RIM’s intention; quite the 
opposite in fact.37 RIM did not desire to commit a patent infringement, and if it was reasonably 
certain to them that their conduct would have amounted to a patent infringement, they likely 
would have avoided such infringement by licensing the technology from NTP. However, such ex 
ante bargaining was impossible due lack of accurate ownership information available to RIM. 
                                               
primarily to define the boundaries of a class of accidental infringement cases which, as we shall see, requires a 
separate consideration if the law is to reach an efficient allocation of resources.  
31 See Cane, supra note 30, at 534 (describing the core of intent as involving some element of “choice” which is 
necessarily subjective). 
32 Famously, in legal literature, this point was argued in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., THE COMMON LAW  27 
(1881). Albeit, Holmes’ may well have been arguing that the law never truly imposes liability depending on 
subjective mental states, but in fact ‘really’ imposes external and objective standards of conduct. This idea has 
continued through many economists understanding of tort law to today, see  RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM M. 
LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 149-159. 
33 See Halo Electronics, Inv. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. 126 S.Ct. 1923, 1933 (2016) (describing culpability in tort 
law as “generally measured against the knowledge of the actor at the time of the challenged conduct”). 
34 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 1 (1987) (“[B]y ‘accidents’ I mean harmful 
outcomes that neither injurers nor victims wished to occur- although either might have affected the likelihood or 
severity of the outcomes.”). Following this definition provided by Shavell, both negligent and non-negligent 
unintentional wrongs is described in this article as accidental. This may differ from some ordinary uses of the term 
‘accident’ which, for some, may refer only to non-negligent unintentional wrongs. This Article prefers to follow 
the more specific definition of accident found in the economic literature as opposed to the ordinary language 
interpretation of the term.  
35 Supra notes 1-6. 
36 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd. 270 F. Supp. 2d 751 (D. Va. 2003).  
37 Id. at 755 (noting that RIM invented the technology before awareness of NTP’s patents). 
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This resulted in RIM not only making and selling an infringing product, but investing substantial 
and irretrievable resources into a telecommunications network on which the phones would 
operate.38  
Similar problems arise when the technology user is the end consumer. At the start of 
twentieth century, patent attorney and inventor George Selden owned a US patent for an 
“improved road engine” powered by a “liquid-hydrocarbon engine of the compression type.”39 
Selden claimed that Ford’s Model T automobile infringed the patent.40 While Selden sued Ford, 
he also threatened the consumers who bought the Model T. Selden advertised that anyone who 
bought a Model T would also “buy a lawsuit.”41 Many consumers were likely unaware that by 
using the Model T, they were “using” technology allegedly subject to a patent, and thus possibly 
themselves infringing the patent. From their perspective, they were merely engaged in a socially 
beneficial activity – driving – and were largely unaware that this doing so came with a risk of 
patent infringement. Ironically, Selden’s threat to sue consumers for using the Model T helpfully 
limited the risk of such accidental infringements of the patent occurring! 
The problem of suing unwary consumers continues today.42 Consider for example, the 
case of the Innovatio lawsuits.43 Innovatio acquired patent rights to certain wireless Internet 
technologies from Broadcom.44 But rather than sue the manufacturers of wireless devices such as 
routers, like Motorola and Cisco, Innovatio instead sued consumers for buying and using the 
devices.45 Innovatio then sent more than 8000 infringement letters to, and initiated 23 lawsuits 
against, small businesses that had bought the wireless devices and were using them, for example, 
to provide internet to their consumers.46 Restaurants, cafes, hotels, bakeries, etc. were alleged to 
be “using” the patented technology and thus infringing their rights.47 Much like the purchasers of 
the Model T, most, if not all, the consumers Innovatio threatened were completely unaware of the 
existence of a patent on the technology they used. 
A variation on this form of accidental infringement occurs when the user of the technology 
is aware of the patent, but is unaware of a relevant patent claim. A famous example of such a 
situation is the Rambus v Infineon case.48 Rambus developed and patented computer memory 
technology used in semiconductor memory devices.49 Like NTP, Rambus was a patent assertion 
entity, whose primary business was the licensing of the patented technology.50 In 1990, Rambus 
applied to the USPTO for a patent over its “Dynamic Random Access Memory” technology.51 In 
1992, Rambus joined the “Joint Electronic Devices Engineering Council” (JEDEC): a standard 
setting organization that developed standards for semiconductor technologies.52 JEDEC had a 
written patent policy encouraging the adoption of standards free of patented items or processes. 
Furthermore, the policy also required members to disclose patents and patent applications “related 
to” the standardization of the work of the Council. In 1993, Rambus disclosed their patent to the 
                                               
38 See Research in Motion, History, available at 
http://www.blackberry.com/select/get_the_facts/pdfs/rim/rim_history.pdf (RIM had signed wireless handheld 
supply contracts with American Mobile, IBM, and Rogers Cantel (now AT&T)). 
39 George B. Selden, U.S. Patent 549,160, 1895 available 
https://patentimages.storage.googleapis.com/5f/45/7f/147a3b78f67eee/US549160.pdf.  
40 JAMES J. FLINK, THE AUTOMOBILE AGE 53 (1990).  
41 Id. Ford subsequently countered by offering to bond his customers against any patent infringement suit. 
42 See generally Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 B.C.L. REV. 1443 (2014). 
Colleen Chien & Edward Reines, Why Technology Customers Are Being Sued En Masse for Patent Infringement & 
What Can Be Done, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 235 (2014). See also, Daniel Nazer, Actually, Mr. Waxman, 
Consumers are Sued For Patent Infringement All the Time, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (April 30, 2014), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/04/actually-mr-waxman-consumers-are-sued-patent-infringement-all-time. 
43 In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig., 921 F. Supp 2d 903, 906 (N.D.Ill 2013).  
44 Id. at 907. 
45 Id.  
46 Id.  
47 Id 
48 Rambus, Inc. v Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F. 3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 S.Ct. 227 (2003). 
49 Id. at 1084. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 1085. 
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group.53 While Rambus was a member, JEDEC adopted a standard for synchronous dynamic 
random access memory to be used by semiconductor manufacturers.54 Semiconductor 
manufacturers then began to manufacture chips using SDRAM technology.55 In 1995, Rambus 
withdrew from JEDEC and filed a number of “continuations” on the original patent (continuations 
allow the patent holder to modify or add additional claims to the patent at a later date in order to 
broaden its scope).56 These continuations ripened into issued patents between 1997 and 1999. 
Rambus then sued Infineon, a manufacturer of semiconductor memory devices (including 
SDRAM), and a member of JEDEC, for infringement of the recently issued patents. While 
antitrust and fraud actions were started against Rambus, the patent was successfully enforced 
against Infineon, despite their lack of knowledge of the patent. More broadly, the story highlights 
how strategically hiding claims, particularly through the use of continuations, can contribute to 
patent accidents.57 
The second form of accidental infringement occurs when the defendant is aware that she 
is using technology that is subject to a patent, but believes that she is operating outside the patent’s 
scope. A classic example of this is the Polaroid v Kodak case.58 Polaroid had long dominated the 
instant camera market, until Kodak decided to enter the sector in the 1970s. Kodak was aware 
that Polaroid owned several patents on instant camera technology. Accordingly they were aware 
that inventing their own instant camera came with a substantial risk of patent infringement. To 
reduce this risk, Kodak hired a top patent lawyer to work with their technical staff.59 The patent 
lawyer gave advice about design choices to avoid infringement.60 At the end of the process, Kodak 
produced a camera that worked in a way entirely in reverse of the Polaroid product.61 
Nevertheless, Polaroid sued Kodak and received significant damages.62 The judge praised Kodak 
for taking such care to avoid infringement, but nevertheless found them liable.63 These types of 
accidental infringement may be called “boundary accidents” rather than “ownership accidents,” 
as the defendant is aware of who owns the technology, but is simply unaware of the scope of the 
patent right. In this Article, we shall put “boundary accidents” to one side, and thus avoid 
assessing the merits of “designing around patents” for the time being. The focus in this Article is 
more firmly on ownership accidents.  
 Of course, the boundaries between ownership and boundary accidents blur in some cases, 
as illustrated by the E-Data controversy. In the 1980s, Charles Freeny invented a kiosk that was 
used by consumers in retail stores to create digital audio tapes.64 However, the patent issued on 
the technology was vaguely and amorphously written.65 The US patent provided the patent holder 
with the exclusive rights to a “system for reproducing information in material objects at a point 
                                               
53 Namely U.S. Patent No. 5,243,703, a divisional of the patent application Serial No 07/510,898. 
54 Id. at 1085. 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 1084. Perhaps even more unsettling, Rambus learned information through their participation in the 
standard setting process that allowed them to write claims that covered the standard. See Bessen and Meurer, supra 
note 8, at 62. 
57 Many proposals have been made to end such abuse, see generally Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending 
Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 BU. L. REV. 63 (2004). But yet the problem of hidden claims remains. Particularly 
troublesome are cases where the patentee adds or modifies claims (to the extent their initial written description 
allows) to anticipate new products produced by competitors, see id. at 74-76. 
58 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also RONALD K. FIERSTEIN, A 
TRIUMPH OF GENIUS: EDWIN LAND, POLAROID, AND THE KODAK PATENT WAR Chapter 9-12 (2015). 
59 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 1990 WL 324105, 76  (D. Mass. 1990) (“During the lengthy 
and detailed patent clearance process he performed for Kodak, Mr. Carr considered over 250 Polaroid and 
non-Polaroid patents and rendered 67 written and countless oral opinions on both the film and camera 
patents.”). 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 76-79 (comparing products). 
62 Id.  
63 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 1990 WL 324105, 79 (D. Mass. 1990) (Judge Mazzone stating that the 
record “shows a patent clearance process that could serve as a model for what the law requires.”). 
64 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 8-10.  
65 Id. See also Seth Shulman, IP’s Bleak House, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (2001) 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/400914/ips-bleak-house (citing the Freeny patent as an example of an 
“absurdly broad patent” that is “fuzzy” and “likely to stymie innovation”). 
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of sale location.”66 In the early 2000s, the patent holding company E-Data argued that the scope 
of this patent’s monopoly covered a wide range of e-commerce.67 Companies such as Microsoft 
and IBM were, allegedly, infringing the patent, by selling downloadable music and software over 
the Internet.68  E-Data sent out 75,000 letters to websites, offering licenses and in return promising 
not to bring legal action.69 It is certain that a large amount of these companies were unaware of 
the Freeny patent (and had committed an “ownership accident”). The boundaries of the patent 
were so vaguely demarcated, that companies such as Microsoft and IBM were not aware that the 
technology they had adopted was subject to a patent right. These types of accidents accordingly 
fall within the scope of this Article’s concern.   
 Lastly, in some cases the user is completely unaware he or she is using the underlying 
technology. A famous, albeit controversial, example of this concerns the Monsanto Roundup 
Ready seeds. In 2005, Percy Schmeiser, a Canadian farmer, was subject to a Canadian Supreme 
Court case.70 Monsanto found Canola on Schmeiser’s farm which had been grown from their 
patented Roundup Ready Canola seeds.71 Schmeiser maintained that he had grown this 
genetically modified crop accidentally.72 Schmeiser argued that other farmers in the area were 
growing Roundup Ready Canola, and that the wind and insects had moved seeds from their crops 
onto his land, causing him to inadvertently grow the crop.73 While this account of events was 
disputed, the issue it presents has long concerned farmers. In the US, the Organic Seeds Growers 
and Trade Association sued Monsanto alleging that preventing this form of “contamination” of 
their organic crops required significant expenditure on their part (in the form of erecting hedges 
and wind barriers, special and temporal crop rotation, etc.).74 Both the Canadian and US Supreme 
Court have declined to determine the patent liability of those who accidentally grow patented 
seeds.75 
B.  The Causes of Patent Accidents 
There are many causes of the patent accident problem, most of which are well 
documented.76 In part, the problem is somewhat unavoidable due to the innate difficulties in 
assigning property rights in intangibles. The boundaries of patent rights will always be elusive 
simply because of the fundamental difficulties of describing an invention in words. This 
fundamental problem contributes significantly to cases such as Kodak.77 However, beyond these 
difficulties, there are further causes which are less intractable; causes which, with appropriate 
policy responses, could be counteracted.   
 One notable cause is the presence of “patent thickets.” Some industry sectors contain 
“dense web[s] of overlapping intellectual property rights” that companies must spend countless 
                                               
66 US Patent 4,528,643.   
67 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 8-10. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902. Controversial because after the seeds had supposedly 
“accidentally” blown onto Schmeiser’s land, Schmeiser replanted the seeds in a way that was arguably an 
intentional infringement of the patent. This case has received much academic commentary. See e.g. Jessica Lynd, 
Gone With the Wind: Why Even Utility Patents Cannot Fence In Self-Replicating Technologies, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 
663 (2013). 
71 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902  
72 Id. 
73 Id.  
74 Organic Seeds Growers and Trade Ass’n v. Monsanto Co. 851 F.Supp. 544, 548 (2012) (“Seed businesses 
and farmers may, at some expense, test their seeds and crops to ensure that no contamination has 
occurred, and non-transgenic farmers may establish buffer zones between themselves and farmers using 
transgenic seed in order to reduce the risk of cross-transmission.”) 
75 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (“In reaching this conclusion, we 
emphasize from the outset that we are not concerned here with the innocent discovery by farmers of "blow-
by" patented plants on their land or in their cultivated fields.); Bowman v. Monsanto, 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1769 
(2013) (declining to rule on the issue of patent exhaustion in cases of technologies which replicate outside 
direct human control). 
76 See generally Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 38-45. 
77 Polaroid Corp v. Eastman Kodak Co. 789 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
2019/05 
 
12 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
hours scouring in order to commercialize a new product.78 A classic example of this problem is 
the smartphone industry. One estimate suggests that 250,000 active patents impact the 
smartphone industry today.79  Incorporating Bluetooth 3.0 technology into a phone requires the 
producer to locate and license over 30,000 patents alone.80 Finding all the relevant patents and 
their owners is for most smartphone producers a Sisyphean task.  As a result, some commentators 
go as far as to say that full patent clearance is simply impossible.81 Under such circumstances, 
some accidental infringement is very hard to avoid.82 Producing new smartphones is clearly a 
socially valuable activity, but doing so imposes very obvious risks of accidentally infringing the 
patent of another company. While there are measures one can take to reduce those risks, e.g. by 
searching the register, those measures are of dubious efficacy and would involve a very significant 
investment of resources. Furthermore, the problem is hardly limited to smartphones, but affects 
“virtually every modern device (e.g. a computer, a car, or a television).”83 In the U.K., the 
Hargreaves Digital Opportunity: Review of IP and Growth found the emergence of patent thickets 
were obstructing entry to some key markets and thus impeding innovation.84 
 The second cause of note is the “notice failure” problem.85 Ideally, patents on the patent 
register should give others in society accurate information about the existence and boundaries of 
the patent. The clearer the description of the claimed invention, the easier it is for producers to 
avoid patent infringement. However, Bessen and Meurer find the U.S. patent system to be 
“critically deficient in this regard.”86 As the eData and Kodak cases illustrate, patent documents 
often do not provide sufficient notice to the public of either the scope of patents. As Judge Learned 
Hand once stated that patent claims “can be such a waste of abstract verbiage” and that it “takes 
the scholastic ingenuity of a St Thomas with the patience of a yogi to decipher their meaning.”87 
The result is not only that accidental “boundary” type infringements occur (as in Kodak) but also 
it makes it more difficult for producers to discover whether a technology is owned and by whom 
(leading to the “ownership” type accidents). As Bessen and Meurer continue to describe, this 
notice failure plays a “crucial role” in leading to inadvertent infringement which is central to the 
rising costs of the patent system.88 
 Furthermore, the notice failure problem is not attributable simply to the innate difficulties 
of demarcating property rights in intangibles, but is, in large measure, a problem of institutional 
design. As Menell and Meurer demonstrate, the current patent system does not provide patent 
holders with sufficient incentives to provide the public with adequate notice.89 Instead, frequently 
inventors can “benefit from obfuscating the scope of rights and keeping others in the dark about 
intellectual property.”90 At the root of the problem is an externality based market failure: 
ownership and boundary information is a public good, when the patentee supplies this 
                                               
78 Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting (2001) 1 
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 120 (2001). 
79 See Mike Masnick, There are 250,000 Active Patents That Impact Smartphones; Representing One in Six Active 
Patents Today, TECHDIRT (Oct. 18 2012). 
80 Even Engstrom, So How Many Patents Are in A Smart Phone? ENGINE (Jan. 19, 2017) 
https://www.engine.is/news/category/so-how-many-patents-are-in-a-smartphone (“Consider Bluetooth 3.0 - a 
technology incorporating the contributions of more than 30,000 patent holders, including 200 universities…”). 
81 See Chiang, supra note 11, at 15-17. 
82 However, some have also questioned how significant the patent thicket problem really is. See Jonathan Barnett, 
Are There Really Patent Thickets? REG. 14 (2016-17) (doubting that patent thickets persist for any significant 
period of time because the market has incentives to arrange ways to avoid the problems – e.g. patent  pools). See 
also Jonathan Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray? 32 BERK TECH L J 1313 (2017). 
83 Id. at 15. 
84 Ian Hargreaves, Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth 10 (2011). For alternative 
solutions to the patent thicket issue, see e.g. Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton et al, Recoupment Patents, N. CAROLINA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
85 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8 at 147 (“Simply put, notice failure and the resulting inadvertent infringement 
are central to the failure of patents to provide positive innovation incentives.”); Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, 
Notice Failure and Notice Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 14 (2013). 
86 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 46. 
87 Victor Talking Mach. Co. Thomas A. Edison, Inc. 229 F. 999, 1001 (2d Cir. 1916). 
88 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8 at 147. 
89 Menell & Meurer, supra note 85, at 1.  
90 Menell & Meurer, supra note 85. 
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information, he or she benefits others in society but does not benefit from doing so herself.91 As 
a result, the patentee faces suboptimal incentives to provide this information to the public.92 In 
fact, the opposite is the case: often the patentee can “benefit from strategically hiding, 
obfuscating, and distorting such information.”93 For example, in relation to the RIM v. NTP case, 
the authors highlight how NTP were in a stronger bargaining position after RIM had “unwittingly 
invested heavily in a potentially infringing wireless email technology.”94 As a result, NTP “clearly 
benefited from its patents not being easily known.”95 Rambus provides a similar example of such 
behavior. 
Similarly, by seeking broad and vague claims, the patentee “maximizes the likelihood that 
the patent can be stretched to reach unforeseen competing technologies” (as illustrated by the 
eData) case.96 A “good” patent drafter will therefore try to construct claims to be ambiguous 
enough so that they can be read narrowly during the patent examination and broadly during patent 
litigation. In some cases, this involves cynical obfuscation techniques. Freilich recently 
demonstrated the problem of “patent clutter.”97 An astonishing 25% of claim language in her 
sample of U.S. patents was not about the patent’s core invention.98 While there are many potential 
reasons why patent holders may choose to “pad” their patent claims with irrelevant language, one 
clear reason is that doing so makes the patent document harder to read and understand, thus 
introduces ambiguity that may be exploited in litigation to ensure the broadest scope of protection 
possible.99  
C.  Literature Review 
A number of commentators have questioned the liability rule applying to unintentional 
patent infringements. Broadly these scholars have proposed three different solutions. The first 
two solutions are the most fully explored. These are either to maintain the strict liability standard, 
or alternatively, to adopt an independent invention defense. The last option (the most under-
explored of the three) is to adopt some form of negligence rule. This Section outlines these 
proposals in turn.  
1. Strict Liability Proposals 
The first option is to maintain the current strict liability rule for one who accidentally 
makes, uses, or sells a patented product. Writing in 2002, Blair and Cotter compared strict liability 
rules and negligence rules for governing patent infringement.100 The authors concluded that strict 
liability was preferable to negligence liability for administrative cost reasons.101 If patent law 
adopted a negligence rule, courts would be required to assess whether the defendant behaved 
reasonably.102 This would require courts to make a decision about the optimal amount of care the 
defendant should exercise (e.g. how much time should the patent holder search the register for? 
would it be reasonable for the patent holder to seek an infringement opinion letter from an attorney 
or patent office?). As strict liability does not require such a costly judicial analysis, they concluded 
strict liability was preferable to negligence.  
Nevertheless, Blair and Cotter did find that a “modified” strict liability rule, wherein 
liability was strictly imposed, but damages were eliminated for those who infringed without actual 
or constructive notice of the patent, was the optimal rule.103 In particular, the authors argued that 
conditioning damages upon constructive notice (namely product marking) would incentivize the 
                                               
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 9. 
94 Id.  
95 Id.  
96 Id. at 33. 
97 Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 IOWA L. REV. 925 (2018). 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 961-65.  
100  Supra note 12. 
101 Id. at 821-29. 
102 Id.  
103 Id.  
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patentee to take care to reduce the chances of inadvertent infringement.104 Furthermore, the 
authors found that in some instances, placing the entire responsibility to avoid inadvertent 
infringement upon the technology user could lead to the technology user to take socially excessive 
care.105  
As a result, although literature routinely cites Blair and Cotter for supporting the strict 
liability regime, their proposed liability regime is in fact closer to a negligence rule than is 
commonly perceived. As will be expanded upon in Part IV, the Blair and Cotter proposal is best 
described as a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense, i.e. the user 
will be strictly liable for damages unless she can show the patent holder failed to take reasonable 
care to avoid the infringement by providing adequate notice.106 As later sections explore more 
fully, this proposal has many of the same benefits of a more straightforward negligence rule. 
Nevertheless, the proposal differs from such a rule in the following ways: the contributory 
negligence standard is defined using a bright line rule (i.e. appropriate marking) rather than a 
vague standard (i.e. did the patentee take “reasonable care”); and the patentee who is 
contributorily negligent nevertheless receives injunctive relief.107 
 More recently, Robert Merges has partially defended the strict liability rule.108 Merges 
focused particularly on whether courts should hold those who do not deliberately copy a patented 
invention ought to be held strictly liable, or alternatively, whether such defendants should be held 
not-liable (absent proof of deliberate copying).109 Merges concludes, tentatively, that such 
innocent infringers ought to be held liable. Merges asked the question: whether “there is anything 
to be said for the absolute liability standard”?110 To which, Merges makes a “tentative start in the 
direction of the current doctrine.”111 The strict liability rule was defended for two reasons. First, 
in many cases, the cost for the patent holder of proving copying would be very high, thus limiting 
the compensation they receive from their invention.112 Second, the strict liability standard may 
increase the dissemination of the technology.113 If an independent invention defense is introduced 
in patent law, defendant companies would limit their contact with patent holders, and would limit 
the information its researchers have access to, in order to increase the chances that, should an 
infringement occur, the independent invention defense would apply.114 By contrast, under strict 
liability, the defendant’s liability does not depend on their level of knowledge, and thus 
companies have less incentive to keep their researchers in the dark about existing patents.115  
 Lastly, some commentators have suggested introducing compulsory licensing regime in 
cases of accidental patent infringement. For example, Lemley and Weiser argues that in cases 
where transaction costs significantly reduce the ability of the patentee and the technology user 
from bargaining for a license, a “liability rule” ought to be implemented, i.e. an obligation to pay 
damages, rather than a “property rule”, i.e. an obligation to stop using the technology until 
receiving the owner’s permission.116 This proposal would cover accident cases wherein the 
technology owner and the patentee often cannot bargain ex ante. What the authors do not question 
is what type of liability rule ought to be in place: strict liability or negligence? This article agrees 
that a property rule ought to give way to a liability rule. But a compulsory licensing regime, where 
damages must be paid upon every accidental infringement, is a version of a strict liability regime. 
Part III considers whether the duty to pay damages ought not be so strictly imposed, but instead 
only awarded where the defendant failed to take reasonable care to prevent the infringement. 
                                               
104 Id. at 834. 
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106 Infra Part IV.A. 
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108 Robert Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement in Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1 (2016). 
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 10. 
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2. Independent Invention Proposals 
 On the other end of the spectrum, some commentators argue that patent law should adopt 
an “independent invention” defense, i.e. a defense for making, using or selling patented 
technology when the user has independently recreated the technology, rather than copying it from 
an existing technology. In 2002, Maurer and Scotchmer proposed that such a defense would be 
beneficial for social welfare.117 The authors posited that two positive consequences would occur, 
should such a defense be introduced. First, the authors found that the threat of entry by 
independent invention would encourage patent holders to license patented technology more 
frequently and at lower prices, thus increasing access to the technology.118 In a system with an 
independent invention defense, it would make financial sense for the patentee to deter market 
entry by an independent inventor through licensing the technology at a price below the price set 
in a legal regime without an independent invention defense. The authors argue that while the 
patentee would receive a lower profit, his licensing revenue would still exceed the amount 
necessary to cover R&D costs. Second, the authors posit that such a doctrine would limit the 
amount of investment into patent “races.”119   
 The common counter-argument to any proposal to adopt an independent invention defense 
is that such a doctrine would negatively affect inventors’ incentives to create. This was partially 
a concern raised in the original Maurer and Scotchmer article.120 The Maurer-Scotchmer 
proposals were based on a model of innovation wherein the costs of research and development 
was relatively low.121 If this assumption is relaxed, and cases where R&D costs are particularly 
high (e.g. such as pharmaceutical research where ex ante probability of success of producing a 
patentable invention are low) then the authors found that an independent invention defense could 
indeed undercut incentives to invent. To avoid this problem, Maurer and Scotchmer suggest 
adopting a series of statutory exemptions to the independent invention defense.122 But this raises 
the problem, as stated by Blair and Cotter, that it leads to rent seeking as certain industries lobby 
to be qualified as an exempted industry.123  
Subsequent commentators have debated whether such a doctrine would diminish 
inventors’ profits too greatly. In 2006, Samson Vermont offered a novel argument in favor of an 
independent invention defense.124  While acknowledging that such a defense would limit patent 
holder profits, Vermont concluded that the reduction in expected profit is likely to have only a 
moderate effect on incentives to invent.125  Vermont argues that many inventions are created by 
more than one person in quick succession (and this is particularly true of highly socially valuable 
inventions, for example, the lightbulb by Edison and Swann, or the telephone by Bell and 
Gray).126 Vermont argues the fact that an invention could be invented by multiple people is 
evidence that a moderate reduction in profits, such as that which would come from allowing an 
independent invention defense, is unlikely to harm incentives to create; it is likely that the reduced 
profits will be enough to motivate at least one inventor to create the invention. However, some 
commentators are not convinced by this argument. While acknowledging the reasoning, Mark 
Lemley responds that the “stakes are quite high” and that, if an independent invention defense 
would significantly reduce the incentives to innovate, then “the potential losses for society are 
substantial”, and this is particularly relevant in the class of high social utility inventions that 
Vermont discusses.127 Lemley concludes that he is “not yet confident that an independent 
                                               
117 Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Independent Invention Defense in Intellectual Property, 69 
ECONOMICA 535 (200). For another proposal relating to independent inventions, see Oskar Liivak, Rethinking the 
Concept of Exclusion in Patent Law 98 Georgetown L.J. 1643 (2010) (explaining and analyzing a “free entry” 
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118 Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 117, at 535-36. 
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124 Samson Vermont, Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
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invention defense will have no undue effect on incentives.”128 
Nevertheless, the merits of an independent invention defense largely fall outside the scope 
of this article’s concern. First, an independent invention defense does more than shield the 
accidental infringer from liability, but has the ability to protect an intentional infringer as well. 
Consider for example someone who independently invents a patented technology. After which, 
she is informed of the patent. Any subsequent selling of the technology would be an intentional 
infringement. However, the independent invention defense would shield her from liability 
flowing from subsequent sales performed with knowledge of the patent. Second, an independent 
invention defense does not necessarily mean the underlying liability rule is not strict. Copyright 
law adopts an independent creation defense, yet the liability rule in copyright law is routinely 
described as strict because “copying” is not necessarily understood as requiring deliberate and 
intentional action.129 These two points indicate there may be some divergence between the 
question of whether an independent invention defense is appropriate, and the question of whether 
a fault standard is desirable.  
Fundamentally, the independent defense question and the fault question are distinct and 
ought not to be confused.  When debating the merits of an independent invention defense, scholars 
are trying to determine what conduct should fall within the scope of the patent monopoly? Should 
uses of the good following independent invention fall within the IP owner’s exclusive right or 
not? The answer to which will depend on a careful balancing of the incentive benefits and access 
costs of extending the scope of the monopoly. This is different from the question posed when 
considering strict liability versus negligence. Here the question is: Assuming the defendant has 
performed some conduct that falls within the scope of the patent monopoly, should the defendant 
nevertheless be exempted from liability on the grounds that they took reasonable care to prevent 
such conduct from occurring? Because these questions are different, the paradigm we use to 
answer these questions is also different. The analytical framework required to answer the fault 
question is distinct from a simple incentive-access cost analysis. Rather, we assume the incentive-
access paradigm has been considered, and that the scope of the patent monopoly is set according 
to that paradigm, and then move on to a distinct, but equally important, policy question: How can 
we most cheaply reduce the costs of such infringement occurring? This analytical framework will 
be applied to our problem in Part III. As a result, the Article focuses squarely on the choice 
between strict liability and negligence liability for infringements of patent rights, and leaves the 
question of an independent invention defense for another day.  
3. Negligence Proposals 
 Relatively few commentators have explicitly explored the use of negligence liability in 
patent law. However, there has been some recent thought in this direction. In 2012, Sterk 
suggested that property law in general, and intellectual property law in specific, should adopt 
negligence rules more frequently.130 Indeed, Sterk highlighted that, contrary to common wisdom, 
property law often relies on negligence rules (or “proxies” for negligence rules) in certain 
circumstances.131 These rules apply often “where ascertaining the scope of boundaries is 
costly.”132 Sterk cites “reasonable encroachers” as an example: where a defendant inadvertently 
builds on the land of another after commissioning a survey to determine the precise boundary 
between the land, courts will often use doctrines such as “relative hardship” to defeat any claim 
brought on behalf of the property owner.133 Sterk argues that courts recognize that, in such 
circumstances, the defendant has taken reasonable care to avoid the infringement, and proxy rules 
are applied to excuse the infringement.134 By contrast, if a defendant builds on a neighbor’s land 
in direct contrast to the survey’s conclusions, courts typically require the defendant to remove the 
                                               
128 Id.  
129 See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1963); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. 
Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1995). 
130 Stewart E. Sterk, Strict Liability and Negligence in Property Theory, 160 PA. L. REV. 2129 (2012). 
131 Id. at 2141-50. 
132 Id. at 2133.  
133 Id. at 2143. 
134 Id.  
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encroachment.135  
 Nevertheless, Sterk’s article, while presenting a novel and interesting argument, is 
incomplete in some important respects. Most importantly, the analytical-theoretical framework 
used to decide whether a negligence rule ought to be imposed could be improved. Sterk accurately 
highlights how it is costly to discern the existence and scope of IP rights.136 But that itself does 
not explain why a negligence rule, as opposed to a strict liability rule, is appropriate.137 There is 
a justificatory “gap” in the paper. To fill in this gap, we require a more defined and robust 
normative framework in place before we can answer these questions fully. Part III of this article 
supplies and applies that analytical-normative framework.  
 In a similar vein, Tun-Jen Chiang recommends that patent law, in theory, should adopt a 
“contributory search” defense to infringement actions (akin to a contributory negligence 
defence).138 While patent doctrine typically expects producers to search for patentees, Chiang 
argues that, in some circumstances, it is in fact easier for patentees to search for producers.139  
Consider for example, the Rambus case discussed earlier.140 As Rambus was aware of the patent 
and the potential for infringement, it was easier for Rambus to alert Infineon to the presence of 
the patent claims than it was for Infineon to discover Rambus’s entitlements.141 Likewise, in some 
industries, such as the smartphone industry, where there are many patentees but relatively few 
producers, it may also be easier for the patentees to keep track of the use of their proprietary 
technology than require producers to clear all patents.142 To reduce the chances of inadvertent 
infringement, Chiang argues that patent law needs some doctrinal mechanism to encourage the 
least cost searcher – whether that is patentee or producer – to conduct appropriate searches. The 
tool for the job is, theoretically, a contributory search (or contributory negligence) defense. 
Inadvertent infringers ought to be able to avoid liability if they can show that in fact the patentee 
was best placed to avoid the infringement. By introducing such a defence, companies like Rambus 
would no longer benefit from hiding their patent claims, and thus the chances of inadvertent 
infringement would be minimized.  
 Nevertheless, questions remain post Chiang’s article. Like Sterk’s article, there is the 
question of which type of negligence rule is preferable? Why, for example, is a strict liability rule 
accompanied by a contributory negligence defense preferable when a simple negligence rule (or 
indeed a comparative negligence rule) would be equally capable of encouraging the producer 
search? Furthermore, neither Sterk nor Chiang directly address a number of “secondary 
considerations” which need to be considered before proposing some form of negligence rule. 
These include, for example, the administrative cost of such a rule and the likelihood of judicial 
errors. Similarly, Chiang’s article is also somewhat limited in scope. The article is focused 
primarily on encouraging patent holders to search for technology users.143 However, there are 
arguably other ways that the patent holder could prevent accidents, outside of searching for 
                                               
135 Id.  
136 Id. 
137 Sterk’s article does make some moves to justify the use of negligence rules by appealing to the concept of 
information costs. However, information cost theory is more helpful when determining how to define property 
rights, than on the question of fault. As discussed in the work of Henry Smith, property rights can be delineated 
using either exclusion or governance strategies, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance: Two Strategies 
for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL. STUD. S453 (2002). The choice of an exclusion strategy or a 
governance stagey ought to be made by comparing the benefit that more precisely delineated property rights would 
provide against the cost of acquiring the extra additional information required to delineate such rights. Once 
property rights are so defined, there is a separate question, discussed in this article, i.e. whether all infringements of 
those rights should result in liability, or only those infringements which result from carelessness. As Part III 
elaborates upon, this decision must be made by examining the effects of the possible liability rules on the parties’ 
incentives to invest efficient levels of resources in accident avoidance.  
138 Supra note 11. Although practical difficulties in doing so leads Chiang to ultimately adopt a more modest 
proposal of amending the current damages framework, id. at 43-50. 
139 Id.  
140 Rambus, Inc. v Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F. 3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert denied, 124 S.Ct. 227 (2003). 
141 Id. at 12-13. 
142 Id. at 4 (“if there are a small number of well-known producers (e.g. a few large companies that dominate an 
industry), while there are thousands of small and unknown patentees, then it would be more efficient to have 
patentees look for producers, rather than have producers look for patentees.”) 
143 Id. 
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technology users, such as by fixing appropriate notice to the work or by writing clearer patent 
claims. Ideally, the question of strict liability versus negligence should consider whether the 
chosen liability rule encourages the patent holder to take these other important precautionary 
measures as well.144 Lastly, as will be elaborated upon in Part III, this Article employs a slightly 
different, but arguably more standard, set of theoretical models to analyze the problem.145 
 What is needed at this stage is a more analytical approach to the question of strict liability 
versus negligence in patent law. While Sterk’s and Chiang’s research provides important insights, 
this present Article builds on their work by providing a less synthetic approach (that focuses on 
highlighting similarities with tort law), and a more analytical dissection of the costs and benefits 
associated with a negligence rule in patent law. It is to that analysis that the Article now turns.  
 III.  The Case for Negligence 
The primary justification for patent rights is utilitarian: patent rights are desirable to the 
extent they maximize the common good.146 In this Article, it is assumed that an efficient use of 
resources will maximize society’s welfare and thus contribute to the common good. But what 
liability rule will result in an efficient use of resources? Using economic models of accidents from 
the law of torts, Section A begins by fleshing out the concept of welfare maximization in this 
context. Contrary to common belief, society’s welfare will not be best served by attempting to 
stop all accidental infringements. Instead, the goal for policymakers should be to encourage 
parties to take cost-justified measures to avoid accidental infringement. Section B and C compare 
various liability rules in relation to this goal. Section D concludes that some form of a negligence 
liability rule is optimal because a negligence rule incentivizes cost-justified accident prevention 
from all relevant parties. This Part finds that the best liability rule is either a simple negligence 
rule or a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense, and explains some 
further reasons for preferring a simple negligence rule. 
A.  The Social Cost of Patent Accidents 
 Accidental infringement of patents harms society. However, spending time and resources 
on preventing accidental infringement is also harmful. Therefore, maximizing the common good 
requires members of society to minimize the aggregate harm (hereinafter “cost”) flowing from 
these two sources. This Section explains each of these points in turn. 
1. Accident Costs 
Inventions are almost universally beneficial for society but, due to a public-goods market 
failure, are likely to be under-produced in a competitive market.147 Patent rights redress this issue 
by providing a time-limited monopoly right. During the patent term, anyone who wishes to use 
the invention must negotiate a license with the patent holder, and pay the inventor a supra-
competitive price. The ability to charge a supra-competitive price enables the inventor to recover 
the fixed research and development costs of the invention, and thus encourages inventors to 
supply inventions at a more socially optimal rate.  
Accidental infringement of patents hampers this goal. In accident cases, it is impossible 
for the technology user to negotiate a license ex ante because, at this point in time, it is not clear 
whether the technology is patented or who the patent holder is. As a result, accidental 
infringement of patents occurs, resulting in the patentee’s invention being used without the 
patentee receiving compensation. This lost revenue represents a private cost to the patentee. More 
importantly, the lost revenue of the patentee may reduce innovation incentives for future 
inventors, resulting in a social cost to the wider public at a later time. For the time being, we shall 
                                               
144 See also Oskar Liivak, Negligent Innovation, (forthcoming) (similarly arguing that accidental patent 
infringement is a bilateral accident wherein incentives need to be set for both parties to take adequate precautionary 
measures).  
145 In particular, this Article departs from the ‘Least Cost Avoider’ model. See infra note 156. 
146 See e.g. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813) in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
326, 334-35 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed. 1903) (society ought only suffer the “embarrassment of an exclusive 
patent” if it “benefits society”) cited in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-11 (1966).  
147 See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 294-334 (2003). 
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assume that the private cost the patentee suffers in lost license fees is a decent proxy for the lost 
future social welfare resulting from decreased innovation incentives.   
Let us call the private cost imposed on the patentee the accident costs or A, and further let 
us assume that if the accident costs are, e.g. $100, that this will reduce incentives for future 
innovation also by $100. Prior to the accident occurring, the technology user cannot say with 
certainty what the accident costs will be, but she can roughly calculate the expected accident 
Costs or pA by multiplying the probability of an accident occurring (p) by the amount of private 
harm (A) that such an accident would cause if it were to occur.   
2. Precaution Costs 
 The technology user can take steps to prevent such accidental infringement occurring. 
Assuming the parties are operating in a country which has publicly accessible register of all 
granted patents, someone engaging in a technical activity can search the register to determine 
whether her activity would infringe a valid patent. Such users can also inspect any relevant 
physical products to see whether they are labeled with patent information (e.g. a patent number). 
Furthermore, users can keep up to date with the patent portfolios of competitors and perform other 
searches (such as simple Google searches). Let us call this user care or Cu.  
Equally, the patent holder can also take care to prevent such accidents. Most importantly, 
the patent holder can mark any products she produces with the relevant patent information148 
(including products which are not themselves patented, but which are produced by a patented 
method149). This traditionally has required physical marking of patented products, but since the 
America Invents Acts, the patentee’s ability to provide notice through marking has substantially 
increased via the use of “virtual marking” i.e. affixing onto articles the word “patent” (or “pat”) 
followed by a URL address directing the user to a website containing patented information.150 
Likewise, patent holders can maintain websites providing “standardized information about all 
intellectual property rights associated with protected products”151 and update those websites as 
new IPRs are acquired. The patent holder can also write clearer patent claims, thus increasing the 
chances that a user searching the registry will find the relevant patent information. Or, as argued 
by Chiang, patent holders can also search for users. In some markets where there are many 
patentees but only a few users of the technology (e.g. the semi-conductor industry where there 
are many patentees but only a handful of producers), then it may be relatively easy for the patentee 
to locate producers and initiate negotiations.152 In some cases, particularly where unwary 
consumers may be involved, the patentee can effectively “spread the word” (as George Selden 
did) about the hazards created by upstream unlawful uses of their works.153 While it certainly 
conceivable that in some cases, the patentee does not have any truly reasonable precautionary 
measures available to her, this is not true of the majority of cases. In most cases, the probability 
of a patent accident is determined not simply by the actions of the technology user, but also by 
the actions of the patentee. Let us call this patentee care or Cp 
It is often underappreciated that taking these measures are themselves costly: it costs the 
technology user resources to search the register; it costs the patentee resources to appropriately 
mark products. Let us call this cost the prevention costs or B (i.e. the parties select a level of care, 
C, thus imposing a level of cost, B). Let us call the technology user’s prevention costs Bu and the 
patentee’s prevention costs Bp.  
                                               
148 See e.g. Claire Curran, A Simple Guide to Marking Your IP Rights, UDL INTEL. PROP. (May 21, 2018).  
149 See Christine Sharkey, Strategic Assertions: Evading the Patent Marking Requirement, 12 NW. J. TECH. & IP 
103 (2014). 
150 See generally United States Patent and Trademark Office, Report on Virtual Marking (2014). See also Gaétan 
de Rassenfosse, Notice Failure Revisited: Evidence on the use of Virtual Patent Marking, NBER Working Paper 
No. 242888 (Feb. 2018). It is questionable whether the marking requirements currently provide adequate incentives 
to innovators to mark, see Menell and Meurer, supra note 86 at 37 (“both patent and copyright law have weakened 
marking requirements over the past several decades as well as penalties for failure to provide accurate notice 
information.”) 
151 Menell and Meurer, supra note 85, at 37. Menell and Meurer consider the possibility of Congress mandating 
this precautionary measure from all companies. 
152 Supra note 142.  
153 Supra note 41. 
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3. Minimizing the Total Costs 
If the user takes care, C, the probability of an accident goes down, and so too does 
expected accident costs, pA. Thus, care has a positive effect on society’s welfare. Simultaneously 
however, as the level of care rises, so too does the prevention costs, B. As a result, taking more 
care, or trying to prevent all accidental infringements, is not necessarily the best social outcome. 
In order to minimize the total cost society loses on accidental infringement, the user must select 
a level of care that results in the least overall cost, taking into account both the probable accident 
costs and the prevention costs.154 As a rule of thumb, it is safe to say that in most cases taking 
some care will help reduce total cost, but that beyond a point, taking more care becomes wasteful 
and has a negative effect on society’s purse.  
As an analogy, consider road traffic accidents. If motorists drive slower, that will reduce 
the probability of accidents and thus their cost. But, this reasoning would not justify a complete 
ban on driving; clearly, if we were to ban driving completely society would be worse off. As 
Guido Calabresi famously pointed out in 1970, if we were to ban driving, the precautionary 
measure used to avoid the accidents would impose more cost on society than simply allowing the 
accidents to occur.155 To put it bluntly, we accept that some level of road traffic accidents will 
occur because it would be too costly to prevent it happening.  
The same is true in patent law today. If technology users take some level of care, e.g. by 
searching the patent register, that will often reduce the chances of an accident occurring and help 
lower total accident costs. But that is only true up to a point. At a certain point, the reverse is true 
and the costs of preventing the patent infringement outweigh the benefit it produces. For example, 
it would obviously be negative for society if all inventors were required to “down tools” and stop 
inventing whenever there was a risk that such technical activity would infringe a patent. 
Therefore, our goal ought not to be the complete eradication of patent accidents altogether. 
Instead, the optimal situation is for users to adopt a reasonable (i.e. cost-justified) level of care. 
More formally, the user ought to take care up to the point that when the marginal cost of such 
care equals the marginal benefit represented by the reduction in expected  accident cost; the user 
ought not to go beyond that point.   
Table 1 illustrates this principle. Consider a hypothetical situation in which only the 
technology user can take care to prevent the patent accident occurring. For example, the 
technology user has invented a new type of mousetrap and is considering whether to 
commercially sell this product. But she is concerned that the mousetrap may already be patented. 
If she does not compensate the patentee for use of the mousetrap, the patentee will suffer a private 
cost of $100. At this point, she has three options: she could not search the patent register, she 
could spend 1 hour searching the register, or she could spend 2 hours searching the register. The 
probability of accident plus the costs associated with the level of care are depicted in the table.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
154 Arguably the cost of patent accidents involves an additional cost, i.e. the cost of duplicative R&D efforts. The 
social cost of the patent accident is not merely the cost to the patentee and the subsequent depression of 
innovation incentives, but also includes the resources society spends on recreating a technology which is already 
exists. See generally WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 302 
(Harvard Univ. Press, 2003). However, for a number of reasons, the Article brackets this potential cost. It is not 
clear whether the majority of accidental infringement cases involve any significant duplication costs. For example, 
the Schmeiser case, discussed supra note 75, the Innovatio cases, discussed supra note 43, or the Rambus case, 
discussed supra note 48, did not involve any wasteful duplication efforts on behalf of the technology user. 
Furthermore, when some duplication is involved, such as in NTP v RIM, the second-comer’s R&D can equally lead 
to benefits in terms of slightly differentiated products with the capacity to better supply consumer demand, see 
generally Christopher S. Yoo, Intellectual Property and the Economics of Product Differentiation, in 1 Research 
Handbook on the Economics of Intellectual Property Law (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., Edward Elgar 2018). 
As a result, it is difficult to say to what extent duplicative efforts exist and impose cost on the patent system. As a 
result, how these costs factor into the basic analysis is left to another day. 
155 Calabresi, supra note 24.   
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Table 1: User Care 
 Cost of Care Probability of 
Accident 
Expected 
Accident Loss 
Total Social 
Cost 
0 Hour Search 0 15% 15 15 
1 Hour Search 3 10% 10 13 
2 Hour Search 6 8% 8 14 
 
In this scenario, total social cost is minimized if the user spends 1 hour searching the 
register for the patentee. Spending 1 hour searching is cost-justified because while it imposes a 
marginal cost of $3, it produces a marginal benefit of $5 (i.e. the expected accident costs reduce 
by $5). However, spending a second hour searching is not cost-justified. A second hour searching 
imposes a marginal cost of $3 but only produces a marginal benefit of $2. Thus, social cost is 
minimized if, and only if, the user takes cost-justified care.  
 In most real-world situations, both the technology user and the patentee can take some 
cost-justified precautions to avoid the accident. Minimizing the total social cost of patent 
accidents often requires the technology user to perform a patent register search, but also requires 
the patent holder to provide appropriate notice of the patent rights by drafting clear claims, by 
marking the product in an accessible manner, and by searching for technology users. Table 2 
illustrates this intuition. Consider once again the technology user that is considering whether to 
sell her mousetrap, and has the option to spend between 0 and 2 hours searching the patent 
register. Further, imagine that the patentee also has the ability to take care at the same cost: the 
patentee also can spend between 0 and 2 hours searching for potential users of her patented 
mousetrap. These “care options” are laid out below. 
In a case such as this, the optimal situation is e: both parties take 1 hour care. As in the 
previous table, the cost-justified level of precaution for the user is to 1 hour care. Any less care 
(options a-c) or any more care (option g-i) would result in higher social cost. Likewise, it is also 
cost-justified for the patentee to spend 1 hour searching: the marginal benefit of $4 in reduced 
expected accident costs exceeds the marginal cost it imposes of $3. However, spending the second 
hour searching is not cost justified because the marginal cost it imposes outweighs the reduction 
in expected accident costs.  
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Table 2: User Care and Patentee Care 
 User 
Care 
(Hours 
Search) 
Patentee 
Care 
(Hours 
Search) 
User 
Care 
Cost 
Patentee 
Care Cost 
Probability 
of Accident 
Expected 
Accident 
Costs 
Total 
Social 
Cost 
a. 0 0 0 0 15% 15 15 
b. 0 1 0 3 11% 11 14 
c. 0 2 0 6 10% 10 16 
d. 1 0 3 0 10% 10 13 
e. 1 1 3 3 6% 6 12 
f. 1 2 3 6 5% 5 14 
g. 2 0 6 0 8% 8 14 
h. 2 1 6 3 5% 5 14 
i. 2 2 6 6 5% 5 17 
 
The table illustrates another important principle: minimizing the total social cost of patent 
accidents cannot be achieved by simply identifying the “least cost avoider.”156 Sometimes the 
argument is made that generally the user can take more effective measures to prevent the accident 
                                               
156 Commonly, a least cost-avoider (LCA) model is used to allocate responsibility in unilateral rather than bilateral 
accidents. In patent law, accidents are bilateral because both parties can affect the probability of an accident. But 
what if only one party can take efficient precautionary measures? Or alternatively, what if both parties can take 
care, but because their care would be largely duplicative, it is better if only one party take care? In these cases, law 
and economics literature often recommends identifying the party which could avoid the accident at the least cost 
and allocate the responsibility wholly to that party, see SHAVELL, supra note 00, at 18 (“[B]oth injurers and victims 
generally ought to do something to avoid risk; the effect of liability rules is therefore different from that in the 
least-cost avoider model.”).  
This version of the LCA analysis ought not to be confused with the LCA analysis provided in Chiang, supra note 
11. Chiang argues that patent law ought to place the burden on the party that can avoid the accident at the least 
cost. However, Chiang’s analysis is more sophisticated than most common versions of the LCA discussed in patent 
law. Chiang’s LCA analysis is a marginal analysis. That is, the law will impose the responsibility on the LCA, but 
it will do so ex post. Parties will not know until litigation who is the LCA. The court will then compare the parties’ 
relative search costs and then determine the LCA. As a result, the parties will not know in advance which party is 
the LCA, and this will give them the incentive to both parties to conduct reasonable cost-justified searches ahead of 
time. A patentee, for example, will not know whether she is will be held the LCA, and accordingly will perceive a 
risk that she will be held to be the LCA and thus contributorily negligent if she fails to perform a reasonable search. 
As a result, Chiang’s proposal is appropriate to a bilateral accident model.  
As a result, Chiang’s analysis aims to set incentives for bilateral care just as the analysis in this Article. 
Nevertheless, some questions linger about the marginal LCA analysis. Most importantly, I find the analysis a little 
convoluted. Standard accounts of accidents typically split accidents into unilateral and bilateral accidents: in the 
former, economists suggest that the law should allocate the responsibility for avoiding the accident to the LCA, 
whereas in the lateral, economists suggest the law should allocate the responsibility using a negligence rule, see 
SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 18. I worry that transporting the LCA concept into the bilateral accident arena makes 
matters more confusing than it needs to be and accordingly invites misunderstandings (See Shavell, supra note at 
34 at 18 (“The model of least-cost avoider may be misleading for thinking about the class of bilateral accidents 
examined in this book.”). Chiang clearly tries to prevent those misunderstandings in the article, but the nuances of 
this analysis may very well be missed by even reasonably alert readers. Secondly, I am not entirely convinced that 
if a court were to determine the LCA ex post, this would always lead to adequate incentives for bilateral care ex 
ante. For example, imagine the user finds a product that she suspects is patented, but which has no patent marking. 
The user may accurately predict that a court in such circumstances would hold the patentee to be the LCA, on the 
grounds that adequate patent marking is lacking. The user may still be able to take some reasonable measures in 
this case, such as performing a search of the registry. However, knowing in advance the likelihood that the patentee 
would be deemed the LCA, would the user still adopt these reasonable measures?   
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than the patentee, and therefore the responsibility should wholly fall on that user to avoid the 
accident.157 But while often true, this criticism is beside the point. Even if the user has generally 
more effective measures than the patentee, the patentee may still have some cost-justified 
precautionary measures which, if taken, would further reduce the accident costs. The goal should 
be to encourage all parties who can take non-duplicative cost-effective care to do so, rather than 
simply set incentives for one party. 
 The table demonstrates this claim. In the scenario, the user has the more effective 
precautionary measures: in option d, the user takes one hour care reducing the probability of the 
accident by 5%, whereas in option b, the patentee takes one hour care thus reducing the accident 
probability by 4%. Therefore, if the choice is to make either the user or the patentee take 1 hour 
care, then making the user take care is preferable because it results in less cost (i.e. $13 instead 
of $14). However, these two options are both less preferable to the optimal situation, option e, 
wherein both parties take 1 hour care: this option reduces cost to $12. This situation occurs 
because user care and patentee care often have a synergetic effect: the effect of the precautionary 
measures are not simply cumulative, but have an effect greater than the sum of its parts.  
Now that we understand our goal (i.e. that both users and patentees should take cost-
justified measures to avoid the accident), the question becomes: What liability rule ought we 
impose to achieve this outcome? What liability rule would help achieve this end? Subsequent to 
Calabresi, legal economists have analyzed when, and in what circumstances, different liability 
rules help minimize accident costs (most notably, Shavell,158 Landes & Posner,159 and Cooter & 
Ulen160). The following Sections apply the analytical frameworks and insights developed in this 
literature to the particular problem of minimizing the cost of patent accidents.  
B.  Liability Rules Compared: Primary Considerations 
Having demonstrated that efficient use of resources requires the patentee and the user to 
take cost-justified preventative measures, the question we must answer next is: Which liability 
rule will encourage the parties to take such care? This Section compares various liability rules in 
relation to this goal. The following section introduces some further variables (or “secondary 
considerations”) into the analysis.  
1. No Liability 
Under a no liability rule, the user is not liable for the accidents she causes. Therefore, the 
accident costs remain with the patentee. Thus, the patentee pays for the costs of her precaution 
and the expected accident costs (i.e. Bp + pA). Meanwhile, the user only pays the costs of her 
precautions (Bu). Both patentee and user are assumed to be rational actors who will select a level 
of care (C) to minimize their own private cost.  
Using our mousetrap example from earlier, Table 3 demonstrates the private costs that the 
parties would bear under various different liability rules. The care options in Table 3 mimic those 
found in Table 2. From this table, we can see that under a no liability rule, the parties will not 
select the optimal levels of care, i.e. option e.  While the patentee will take the appropriate care, 
the technology user will not.161 As the technology user is still liable for willful infringement, the 
patentee’s best financial strategy is to alert the user to the patent, thus improve the chances of a 
licensing deal. On the other hand, in order to minimize her private costs, the technology user will 
select to spend 0 hours searching, i.e. options a-c. From these options, the patentee will select to 
spend 1 hour searching because this minimizes her private expenditure (i.e. she spends $14 rather 
than $15 or $16). Therefore, the equilibrium is that the parties will select option b and total social 
cost will be higher than optimal (e).  
                                               
157 See Chiang, supra note 11 at 10-14 (summarizing versions of this view). 
158 Supra note 34. 
159 RICHARD POSNER & WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) 
160 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS (2016). 
161 This is, of course, a highly stylized analysis. In reality, a range of other doctrinal mechanisms (see e.g. 35 USC 
112 definiteness requirement) and practical realities encourage some patentee care. However, the preceding 
discussion reveals that these instruments alone lead to sub-optimal incentives as evidenced by the high rate of 
accidental infringement. Therefore, this analysis strips those considerations away to first establish what liability 
rule is appropriate, and then later in Part IV analyzes some of the doctrines already in place to encourage such care.  
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2. Strict Liability 
Under a strict liability rule, the user must pay the patentee compensatory damages, or a 
liability award, L, which is equal to the accident costs. Therefore, the patentee only bears the cost 
of her own precaution (Bp), while the technology user pays the costs of her precaution and the 
expected liability award (i.e. Bu + pL). Once again, both parties select a level of care that will 
minimize these costs. The parties’ private costs associated with this liability rule are found above 
in Table 3.   
This rule will once again result in sub-optimal behavior. The patentee will minimize her 
costs by selecting 0 hours search, i.e. options a, d, or g. Meanwhile, the defendant will select to 
perform 1 hour search because this minimizes her cost (she pays $13 rather than $14 or $15). The 
resulting in equilibrium is option d and total social cost is higher than optimal. 
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Table 3: Private Cost Under Liability Rules 
 
3. Negligence 
In contrast to strict liability and no liability, this Section demonstrates that a negligence 
rule would encourage cost-justified care from both parties. A liability rule is a categorized as a 
negligence rule if the decision to impose liability is conditional upon one or more party’s level of 
preventative care falling below an acceptable level.162 There are multiple different forms such a 
negligence rule could take: simple negligence, strict liability plus a contributory negligence 
defense, negligence plus a contributory negligence defense, or comparative negligence; each one 
provides incentives for bilateral cost-justified care.163  
                                               
162 See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 160, at 189-228. 
163 Id.  
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Under a simple negligence rule, the technology user pays compensatory damages if she 
fails to take all reasonable care.164 Care is considered “reasonable” if it is cost-justified (this is 
the famous Learned Hand formula where care is considered reasonable if the marginal benefit it 
produces is greater than the marginal cost it imposes).165 Therefore, if a technology user fails to 
take all reasonable care, she will pay a liability award plus any care she does take (i.e.  Bu + pL); 
meanwhile, the patentee in this situation will only pay for her own precaution costs (i.e. Bp). 
Alternatively, if a technology user does take all reasonable care, she will only pay for the cost of 
her care (i.e. Bu); meanwhile, the patentee will pay for her care and any remaining expected 
accident costs (i.e. Bp + pA). The private costs the parties face under a negligence rule are above 
in Table 3.  Under this rule, a technology user will minimize her costs by selecting 1 hour search. 
Taking any care below this level exposes her to liability, while taking care above this level 
imposes extra prevention costs. Therefore, the technology user will select option d, e, or f. From 
these options, the patentee minimizes her costs by selecting 1 hour care. The equilibrium is that 
both parties take the appropriate level of care and social cost is minimized.  
Under a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence, the user is liable for all 
accidents she causes, unless the patentee is contributorily negligent.166 If the patentee is 
contributorily negligent, the user is not liable. A defendant is contributorily negligent if she failed 
to take all reasonable care to prevent the accident. Once again, reasonable is equated with cost-
justified precaution. Therefore, if the patentee takes reasonable care, then the patentee pays for 
her own care costs (Bp), while the technology user pays for her own care costs and expected 
liability (Bu + pL). If the patentee fails to take reasonable care, then the patentee pays for her own 
care plus any expected accident costs (Bp + pA), while the user pays for her care costs only (Bu). 
Table 3 lists the private costs the parties face under this rule. Under this rule, the patentee will 
select to perform 1 hour search (i.e. options b, e, or h) as this minimizes her costs (i.e. $3). From 
these options, the user will select option e as this minimizes her costs. The result is the parties’ 
select option e and total costs are minimized.  
Under a negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense, the user is liable for 
accidents caused by her negligence, unless the patentee was also negligent. Once again negligence 
is defined as failure to take reasonable care according to the Learned Hand Formula.167 Under 
this rule, the following options emerge: (1) if the user takes reasonable care, she bears the cost of 
her own precaution only (Bu); meanwhile the patentee bears the cost of her own precaution plus 
any remaining expected accident costs (i.e. Bp + pA); (2) if the user fails to take reasonable care, 
and the patentee takes reasonable care, then bears the cost of her own precaution and any expected 
liability costs (Bu + pL); meanwhile, the patentee pays for her own precaution costs (Bp); if the 
user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee also fails to take reasonable care, then the user 
bears only her own precaution costs (Bu); meanwhile the patentee pays for her own precaution 
costs and any remaining expected accident costs (Bp + pA). Table 3 demonstrates the private costs 
associated with each liability rule. Under this rule, the patentee has an incentive to take cost-
justified precaution. By searching for one hour, the patentee can minimize her own private costs 
(any less than this exposes her to the possibility of being held contributorily negligent and paying 
for the expected accident costs; any more than this is unnecessarily increases her precaution 
costs). If the patentee can be expected to search for one hour, then the options for the technology 
user are options b, e and h. To minimize her private costs she will select option e (any less exposes 
her to liability, any more than that is unnecessary to avoid liability). Once again, the optimal 
choice is reached.  
Lastly, under a comparative negligence rule, the user is not liable when she takes due care. 
If she fails to take due care, then she will be liable. However, if she fails to take due care, and the 
patentee also fails to take due care, then the court will apportion the accidents costs between the 
two parties according to their level of fault.168 Therefore, the following options emerge: (1) If the 
                                               
164 Id. at 196.  
165 Id. at 205-08. 
166 Id. at 208-11.  
167 Id. Note, this is distinct from the type of “contributory negligence” rule used in other common law systems, 
particularly the U.K. where “contributory negligence” refers to a reduction in damages proportional to the 
defendant’s fault, see Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 §1 (UK). 
168 Id.  
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user takes reasonable care, she bears the cost of her own precaution only (Bu); meanwhile the 
patentee bears the cost of her own precaution plus any remaining expected accident costs (i.e. Bp 
+ pA); (2) if the user fails to take reasonable care, and the patentee takes reasonable care, then the 
user bears the cost of her own precaution and any expected liability costs (Bu + pL); meanwhile, 
the patentee pays for her own precaution costs (Bp) (3) if the user fails to take reasonable care, 
and the patentee also fails to take reasonable care, then the user bears her own precaution costs 
and a portion (assumed here to be half) of the accident costs in liability (Bu + pL/2); meanwhile, 
the patentee pays for her own precaution costs and any remaining expected accident costs (Bp + 
pA/2). Table 3 demonstrates the private costs associated with each liability rule. Under this rule, 
the technology user minimizes her own costs by taking one hour care (options d-f). Thereafter, 
the patentee minimizes her costs by selecting one hour care. The equilibrium is option e, and total 
cost is minimized.  
C.  Liability Rues Compared: Secondary Considerations 
Thus far, the analysis has demonstrated that all versions of a negligence rule are preferable 
to a strict liability rule or no liability. Because negligence rules encourage both technology user 
and patentee to take cost-justified precautions, such rules help minimize total social cost. By 
selecting a level of care that conforms to the standard of reasonable care as defined by the Hand 
formula, each party has the ability to shift the accident costs onto the other party, thus minimizing 
their own private costs. This Section introduces further considerations that complicate the 
analysis, but that also help us select which version of a negligence rule is preferable. Those 
secondary considerations are: activity levels, administrate costs, error costs, and externalities.  
1. Activity Levels 
Taking more precaution is not the only way the parties can reduce the chances of an 
accident occurring. The other option is for the parties to change their activity levels.169 For 
example, in road traffic accident cases, drivers could reduce the possibility of an accident by not 
speaking on their cell phones while driving, but they could also reduce the probability of an 
accident simply by driving less. Likewise, in patent law, the technology user could reduce the 
probability of a patent accident by engaging in technical activities less often, and the patentee 
could also reduce the probability of an accident by reducing their level of innovation. However, 
the parties engage in these activities because doing so brings them utility. Therefore, while 
engaging in the activity less reduces the chances of harmful accidents, it also reduces the utility 
the parties receive. Table 4 illustrates this relationship.  
Table 4: Activity Levels 
 User 
Activity 
User 
Utility 
User 
Care 
Cost 
Ptee 
Activity 
Ptee 
Utility 
Ptee 
Care 
Cost 
Total 
Accident 
Losses 
Total 
Social 
Welfare 
1 1 40 3 1 40 3 20 54 
2 2 60 6 2 60 6 40 68 
3 3 69 9 3 69 9 60 60 
4 4 75 12 4 75 12 80 42 
5 5 70 15 5 70 15 100 10 
 
 Table 4 assumes that both the user and the patentee are now considering how much time 
to spend on the activity that may create patent accidents (i.e. innovation). Each party acts to 
maximize their own private utility. Total social welfare is calculated by adding the user utility 
and the patentee utility and subtracting the user care costs, the patentee care costs, and the total 
                                               
169 Id. at 211-13. 
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accident costs. Option 2 – both parties engage in the activity 2 times – is optimal as this maximizes 
social welfare. Table 5 depicts the utility each party would receive under various different liability 
rules.  
 
Table 5: Activity Levels under Liability Rules 
 No Liability Strict Liability Simple 
Negligence 
Strict Liability + 
Contributory 
Negligence 
 User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
User 
Utility 
Ptee 
Utility 
1 40 17 17 40 37 17 17 37 
2 60 14 14 60 54 14 14 54 
3 69 0 0 69 60 0 0 60 
4 75 -21 -17 71 63 -21 -21 63 
5 70 -45 -45 70 55 -45 -45 55 
   
 Under no liability, the user will engage in too much technical activity (in addition to not 
taking sufficient care), whereas the patentee will engage in the optimal amount of technical 
activity.170 The user maximizes her utility by simply selecting an option which yields the highest 
utility, i.e. option 4. Meanwhile, the patentee bears the cost of any care she takes and the expected 
accident costs. To maximize utility, the patentee sets an activity level that yields the highest utility 
minus the cost of care and the expected accident costs, i.e. option 2. Meanwhile, a strict liability 
rule yields the opposite conclusion. The user sets an activity level that maximizes her utility minus 
the cost of care and the expected accident costs, i.e. option 2, while the patentee selects an activity 
level that yields simply the highest utility, i.e. option 4.  
 More important, however, is the difference between the activity levels under a simple 
negligence rule and a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence defense. Under the simple 
negligence rule, the user will select an activity level that maximizes her utility minus the cost of 
care, i.e. option 4; the patentee meanwhile selects an activity level that maximizes her utility 
minus the cost of care and any remaining accident costs, i.e. option 2.171 Therefore, the user 
engages in the activity too frequently, but the patentee does so at the optimal level. This is because 
the patentee is the residual bearer of the harm.172 Under a negligence rule, as demonstrated 
earlier, both parties will take cost-justified precautions. Nevertheless, there is still an expected 
accident cost when both take such precautions. The question is: Who bears this cost? In 
negligence, it is the patentee who bears this cost: as the user takes due care, she is not liable and 
the expected costs remain with the patentee. 
 Under a strict liability rule with contributory negligence, the opposite result is achieved 
because now the user and not the patentee is the residual bearer of the harm. Under this rule, the 
patentee will set her activity level that maximizes utility minus the cost of care. Meanwhile the 
user will set an activity level that maximizes her utility minus the cost of care and the expected 
accident costs.173 As a result, the user will engage in the activity at the optimal level, but the 
patentee does not. Likewise, under a negligence rule with contributory negligence, the patentee 
is the residual bearer of harm, therefore will take the appropriate activity level, but the user will 
not. The same is true for comparative negligence.  
 What this demonstrates is that no liability rule yields incentives for both bilateral care and 
optimal bilateral activity levels. Any form of negligence rule will result in only one party 
internalizing the benefit of adopting an appropriate activity level, and as a result the other party 
                                               
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
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will engage in the activity at too great an extent. The only theoretical exception to this would be 
if judges take activity levels into account when defining reasonable care under the Hand Formula. 
However, it is generally agreed that judges do not have the institutional ability to determine how 
much of an activity a private party ought to engage in (e.g. how many miles someone ought to 
drive their car). 
 The normal response to this by economists of tort law is to make the party whose activity 
is more likely to yield accidents the residual bearer of the harm.174 For example, accidents 
involving motors and bicycles involve bilateral care: cars can drive slower and with more 
observations, cyclists can wear appropriate colors and lights; it is optimal for both parties to take 
some level of care. However, the party who has the most control over the accident is likely the 
motorist – no amount of brightly colored vests will prevent the accident if the motorist drives 
with very little awareness of her surroundings. Ideally therefore, a strict liability + contributory 
negligence rule ought to be adopted. In which case, both motorists and cyclists will take an 
optimal care level, and because the motorist is the residual bearer of the harm, the motorist will 
select the appropriate activity level; the cyclist will not take the appropriate activity level and 
spend too much time cycling, but this is less dangerous than motorists spending extra hours on 
the road.  
 What does this mean for patent accidents? The answer is: surprisingly little! Having 
already established in section B that it is preferable to adopt some form of negligence rule to 
ensure bilateral care, the pressing question is: Which version of the negligence rule is preferable? 
However, we see that whatever version we choose will result in one party selecting an activity 
level that is higher than optimal. If a simple negligence rule is adopted, the user will engage in 
too much technical activity because she is not the residual bearer of harm (and the same for 
negligence + contributory negligence or comparative negligence); whereas if a strict liability rule 
with a contributory negligence defense is adopted the patentee will engage in too much technical 
activity. Therefore, we need to pick between the lesser of two evils: too much activity from the 
patentee or from the user.  
 The problem this presents is twofold. First, I am unconvinced that controlling the level of 
activity – innovation – is, as a practical matter, likely to improve social welfare. Innovations come 
with very significant positive externalities (or “spillovers”): new innovations spur future 
innovations in unpredictable and often very significant ways, and much of this value is not 
captured by the patentee.175 While the law of diminishing marginal utility makes it clear that at 
some point investing in further innovation must become socially excessive, it seems unlikely that 
we are at such a point today. As a practical concern, the level of compound growth created by 
innovation suggests that the positive externalities associated with greater innovation will nearly 
always be greater than the social loss flowing from increased accident costs.176 Thus the “optimal” 
activity level seems of minor significance. 
However, put this concern to one side and assume that there is an optimal level of 
innovation that the parties ought to be engaging in from a welfare point. Even if we assume this, 
it is not clear that either party’s activities are more important to control in order to closer reach 
the social optimal. To decrease the expected accident costs, is it more important for the user to 
engage in less innovation, or is it more important for the patentee to engage in less innovation 
and to patent less frequently? I do not see a clear answer to this question. It seems initially that 
both parties’ activities have an equal effect on the probability of an accident occurring. While 
there certainly may be individual cases where one party’s activities may contribute greater to the 
chances of an accident, it is hard to say with any confidence whether globally, across the whole 
range of patent infringement, controlling the patentee’s or user’s activities is comparatively more 
important.177  
Therefore, the importance of activity levels ought to be largely bracketed when asking 
                                               
174 Id. 
175 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 259 (2007).  
176 Robert Cooter, The Falcon’s Gyre: Legal Foundations of Economic Innovation and Growth (2014) (arguing 
that “innovation causes compound growth that swamps static inefficiency like a tsunami swamps a cow.”). 
177 This conclusion seems to stand even if the technology user is merely a non-innovative manufacturer/distributor. 
Society would not seem particularly well-served by trying to control the amount of products that are made and 
distributed any more than it would be by limiting the amount of innovation. 
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which is the optimal liability rule. To determine which is the best form of liability rule, we will 
need to spend more time focusing on the following criteria: administrative cost, error cost, and 
externalities.  
2. Administrative Cost 
Whatever rule is selected, actors in the legal system will need to apply the rule to real 
world cases. Different liability rules lead to greater or lesser amounts of such administrative 
costs.178 The cost of application depends on a number of factors, the most important of which are 
the complexity of the rules, and the number of cases requiring resolution.  
Strict liability is a relatively straight forward rule to apply, but it also leads to a high 
number of infringement cases.179 The rule is straightforward in application because, unlike 
negligence, the court is not required to conduct a complex factual inquiry into the reasonableness 
of the defendant’s behavior.180 However, this initial cost saving is diminished because the strict 
liability rule results in more cases of infringement. Under a strict liability rule, nearly all cases of 
infringement will require some form of resolution. At its most costly that resolution will take the 
form of litigation and adjudication. But even cases which do not involve litigation will produce 
additional costs. In all cases of infringement, the patentee will attempt to shift the cost to the 
technology user, and this will involve procedure and associated costs. In the absence of litigation, 
that cost will come through alternative dispute resolution, inter-party negotiation, damage 
calculations, and transferring monetary compensation. By contrast, a negligence rule has the 
benefit of removing a subset of infringement cases and eliminating their associated resolution 
costs. Thus, a negligence rule has the benefit of reducing the amount of case resolution, although 
each case of infringement involves increased complexity.181   
Which would involve less administrative costs overall? It is difficult to say with 
confidence. The question depends on whether more frequent litigation, or more complex 
litigation, is a more significant contributor to the cost of the patent system. When comparing 
liability rules generally, strict liability is typically seen as the least administratively costly rule. 
On the other hand, existing empirical evidence suggests that the administrative costs of patent 
liability are currently very high, and this may be in part due to the current strict liability rule. 
Bessen and Meurer’s empirical analysis of the U.S. patent system found that patent litigation costs 
have “exploded” over past decades.182 The cost of the patent litigation annually for firms 
(excluding chemical and pharmaceutical firms) increased six-fold from 1984 to 1999 (from less 
than $184 billion to $1,104 billion).183 What is driving this explosion? The authors conclude that 
the “increase in aggregate litigation cost is mainly driven by the increasing frequency of litigation, 
which has roughly tripled since the 1980s.”184  Litigation cost is exploding not only because trials 
are becoming more complex and time consuming,185 but primarily because the volume of 
litigation is increasing. While ultimately, we do not have sufficient empirical evidence to fully 
determine the administrative costs of each liability rule, we can certainly say that a strict liability 
                                               
178 See Cooter and Ulen, supra note 160, at 223-25. 
179 Id.  
180 Furthermore, the rule is also easier to apply for individual parties. Currently under strict liability, patentees do 
not need to assess the technology user’s level of care prior to deciding to take action or not, whereas they would 
under a negligence rule. Under a negligence rule, not only would courts in litigation need to spend more 
resources on examining the defendant’s care, patentees would spend more resources on discovery and 
exploratory litigation to determine the defendant’s level of care. 
181 While negligence can increase the complexity of cases, it also has the potential to limit their complexity. In a 
subset of cases, it will be relatively easy for a court or fact finder to determine whether the defendant behaved 
negligently. In such cases, the decision maker can potentially determine the outcome of the case by examining 
the negligence issue only, without making a ruling on typically complicated matters such as claim construction. 
182 Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, at 16. 
183 Id.  
184 Id.  
185 Although, that indeed is happening due to the increasing complexities of claim construction, see generally Tun-
Jen Chiang & Lawrence Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 572-92 
(2013); Dan L. Burke & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 PENN 
L. REV. 1743 (2009). 
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regime is not conclusively less administratively costly than a negligence liability rule.186  
Finally, it is worth noting that to the extent that a negligence rule is more complicated to 
apply, this cost is mitigated by the doctrine of stare decisis. Over time, courts applying a 
negligence standard will develop categories and clearer proxy rules for identifying negligence. 
This will aid in reducing the cost of applying the reasonableness test in future cases.  
3. Error Cost 
Courts are likely to make errors when applying the liability rule. In particular, courts may 
make errors when calculating the level of damages, or courts may make errors in defining the 
reasonable care standard.187 Both of these errors, if made consistently, could lead to the parties 
adopting sub-optimal levels of care.  
A strict liability rule is highly prone to erroneous damage calculations. As demonstrated 
above in Table 3, a strict liability rule will incentivize the technology user to adopt an appropriate 
level of care. However, this assumes the liability award, L, is set equal to the accident costs. If 
the liability award is greater or less than the accident cost, A, then the user will take more or less 
than the optimal care level. Currently, under a strict liability rule, it is assumed that the patentee 
will take no care, and the user has a choice of taking 0 hours care, 1 hour care, or 2 hours care. 
One hour care is optimal, and because this option lowers the user’s costs (this option costs her 
$14 whereas option a costs $16 and option g costs $15), she will take this care. However, if the 
court erroneously calculates the damages and the liability award is double the actual damages, 
then the user has a choice of taking 0 hours care (for $30), 1 hour care (for $25), or two hours 
care (for $24). In this scenario, the user will take greater than optimal care because the liability 
award is much higher than the compensatory level. Therefore, while errors in judging reasonable 
care are impossible when applying a strict liability rule, errors in calculating damages are a 
significant challenge to setting the appropriate incentives for care.  
A simple negligence rule is the mirror image of a strict liability rule: while courts will 
make errors in applying the standard of care, errors in calculating damages are far less significant 
than in strict liability.188  Errors in applying the standard of care are highly significant. If the court 
sets the standard too high, technology users will over-invest in care. For example, in Table 3, 
imagine the court miscalculates the cost of the technology user’s patent search, and believes the 
cost of the second hour searching is only $1 (not $3). Under the Hand formula, a court would find 
that a reasonable person would take this extra hour searching (because now the marginal benefit 
of $2 in expected accident cost saved is greater than its marginal cost of $1).189 As a result, the 
user would have an incentive to conform to that higher standard, and take 2 hours care, to avoid 
a liability award, even though doing so deviates from the optimal care level. Likewise, if courts 
routinely set the standard of care too low, defendants will frequently under-invest in care.190  
On the other hand, the incentives for care set by a negligence rule are far less susceptible 
to distortions created by erroneous damage calculations, so long as the standard of care is 
optimally set. If the standard of care is set at the correct level, the defendant has an incentive to 
conform to that standard, and thus avoid a liability award, regardless of the level of damages. For 
                                               
186 One potential counter-argument is that the increased uncertainty of a negligence rule will increase the amount of 
litigation, following the Priest-Klein hypothesis that win rates for plaintiffs tend towards 50 percent in cases where 
litigants have symmetric stakes, see George Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 1 (1984). However, to the extent that this is true, the effect must be balanced against 
the counter-veiling affect that the scope of infringement is decreased under negligence, that negligence sets better 
incentives for accident precaution, and that in many cases defendants will know in advance whether they have 
successfully adopted reasonable care thus limiting the uncertainty of the rule. When appreciated globally, it seems 
more likely that infringement cases will decrease under negligence, however the margin of such decrease will 
likely be smaller given the small potential for increased litigation flowing from uncertainty in the negligence rule.   
187 See Cooter & Ulen, supra note 160, at 217-20. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. 
190 A related point is that a negligence defense rule may open the door to opportunistic behavior. Defendants who 
know of the patent may nevertheless document efforts at reasonable accident precaution in the hope that the paper 
trail may hide their intentional infringement. However, this would be a risky strategy for a defendant to adopt. In 
such cases, their infringement is willful. If the willfulness is discovered, they will face enhanced damages. The risk 
of hiding their intentional infringement in this manner would need to be weighed against the risk of enhanced 
damages. See generally Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 1427 (2018). 
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example, consider the case just introduced where the court sets the liability award at double the 
accident costs. But, now consider the case under a negligence rule where the court accurately sets 
the standard of care. In this case, if the user adopts 0 hours care, her expected liability is $30. But 
if she takes one hour care, she is not liable and only pays her cost of care, i.e. $3. If she adopts 
two hours of care, she is once again not liable and pays only the cost of care, i.e. $6. Thus, if the 
standard of care is set correctly, errors in damage calculations are insignificant, because the 
parties have the incentive to conform to the cost-justified care required by the negligence rule.191  
Unfortunately, strict liability plus contributory negligence is the worst of both worlds. As 
the technology user is subject to strict liability, her incentives are highly affected by 
miscalculations in calculating damages. In the example just discussed, distortions would likely 
occur in user care under such a liability rule. The patentee avoids liability only by conforming to 
the reasonable care standard. As a result, the user assumes the patentee takes such care, and that 
she will be held strictly liable. Thus, her options are to take 0 hour care (for $30), 1 hour care (for 
$25), or two hours care (for $24). She will minimize her costs by taking two hours care, even 
though this is higher than optimal. Meanwhile, if the standard of reasonable care is set incorrectly 
in the contributory negligence analysis, then the patentee will have an incentive to conform to 
that sub-optimal standard. Thus, as compared to strict liability and negligence liability, strict 
liability plus contributory negligence yields both types of error cost. 
A negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense and a comparative negligence 
rule are also problematic. Compared to a simple negligence rule, which would distort the 
incentives for the technology user only, errors in setting the negligence standard under these rules 
would distort the incentives bilaterally.  
4. Externalities 
Until now, the analysis has assumed that the private harm suffered by the patent owner is 
a perfect proxy for the public harm suffered when an accidental infringement occurs. However, 
frequently this is not the case. Often inventions come with significant positive externalities (or 
spillovers) which cannot be captured by the patent monopoly.192 For example, imagine in our 
scenario in Table 2, the patent at issue is a drug which alleviates the symptoms of the common 
cold. The patent enables the inventor to charge producers of the drug $100. However, frequent 
use of the medicine by people in society may have the further benefit of reducing the spread of 
the cold virus (due to less frequent coughing and sneezing). Thus, the value to society that 
accompanies the production of the drug may be higher than the patentee’s private value, e.g. $200. 
In order for society to minimize the cost of accidents, the user must take cost-justified care, taking 
into account the cost of the precautions and the expected accident costs. But the expected accident 
costs must reflect the social loss that would accompany the patent accident, not merely the private 
loss caused to the patentee.  
Similarly, we have so far assumed that the utility the user receives from production of her 
product is a perfect proxy for the public good associated with the user’s technical activity. Once 
again, this is not necessarily the case. The technical activity of the user may provide significant 
positive externalities beyond that captured in the user’s private utility. For example, if the 
invention is a wireless network technology, a user may create a type of cell phone employing 
                                               
191 Theoretically it is possible for too low damages to result in distortions even under a negligence regime. It is not 
impossible, for example, for a technology user to prefer to select pay incorrectly low damages rather than invest 
in cost-justified precautionary measures, see Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82, 136 (2011) 
(assuming when the standard of care is optimal, “injurers will be under deterred with too-low damages” but will 
be “optimally deterred with efficient and too-high damages.”). However, this problem would seem to occur 
infrequently in patent law. The miscalculation of damages would need to be very significant to result in a case 
where the user technology user would prefer to select damages rather than take precaution. For example, take 
the case where the expected accident (pA) costs are $110,000, and the defendant can take care for a cost of 
$10,000 which will reduce the expected accident costs by 10%. In such a case, care is efficient as $10,000 in care 
will result in a $11,000 reduction in expected harm. Therefore, under a negligence rule, the defendant’s choice is 
to either take care for $10,000 or expect to pay $110,000 in liability. If the court incorrectly sets the liability 
award at, e.g. $100,000, or $75,000, or $50,000, the same result will occur. Only if the damages are set very 
significantly too low, i.e. below $10,000 will the technology user’s incentives be distorted. 
192 See Frischman & Lemley, supra note 175. 
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wireless emails. The user’s product may be a commercial success, yielding private utility for 
herself, but widespread use of this product may have even greater social benefits, because the 
new product enables faster communication between people in society leading to better 
information transfer. When seeking to minimize the social costs of accidents, the user should take 
cost-justified precautions taking into account the public, not merely the private, benefit produced 
by the user’s technical activity.  
However, under a strict liability rule, users will not take into account positive externalities. 
Take the cold medicine example to illustrate. The private harm that the user’s use causes the 
patentee remains $100. Thus, prior to the accident occurring, the expected accident costs, and 
thus the expected liability costs, are the same as those presented in Table 3. Thus, the user will 
still adopt 1 hour care. However, this is no longer optimal. Assuming the probability of the 
accident occurring remains the same, if the user takes 0 hours care, the expected accident costs 
are now $30; if the user takes 1 hour care, the expected accident costs are $20; and if the user 
takes 2 hours care, the expected accident costs are $16. Thus, 0 hours care yields a social loss of 
30; 1 hour care yields a total social cost of $17; and two hours care yields a total social cost of 
$10. Accordingly, taking a second hour of care would be cost justified and minimize society’s 
total social cost. Nevertheless, the user will not take this optimal level because the court has not 
considered the public harm caused by the infringement.  
One way to rectify this problem would be for the court to alter the liability award to reflect 
the public harm rather than the merely private harm.193 But there are significant practical obstacles 
to doing so. Patent infringement usually results in a compensatory damage award, where the 
remedy seeks to redress the private harm.194 Altering this would require the court to provide a 
supra-compensatory remedy. This leads to a “windfall” problem i.e. the patentee receives more 
damages through a court-imposed remedy than the patent allows her to get on the open market 
through licensing.195 The patentee thus has an incentive to sue for damages rather than license the 
technology. If reducing accident costs is the goal, it is counter-intuitive at best to provide 
patentees with an incentive not to license the invention, but instead to prefer for damages once an 
accidental infringement occurs. Unless the patent right could be altered in some way to enable 
the rights holder to capture the full social value of the invention (a suggestion itself of dubious 
value),196 then avoiding perverse incentives would require avoiding higher damage awards.  
On the other hand, a negligence rule can be adjusted to reflect externalities, and thus 
incentivize the user to take such external cost into account. If the patented invention produces 
substantial positive externalities, then the court can take this into account when assessing the harm 
caused by the accidental infringement. As a result, the user would be required to take a greater 
level of care in order to avoid liability. Alternatively, if the user’s own activities involve 
substantial positive externalities, the court can increase the cost of the precaution in the reasonable 
care standard to reflect this value; once again the user would conform to this appropriate standard.  
However, a negligence standard will not encourage the patentee to take appropriate care, 
taking into account positive externalities. Assuming the user conforms to the standard of care, the 
patentee only bears the private costs of the accident ( her private care costs and the private 
expected accident costs) and not the public costs of the accident, (the private cost of preventing 
the accident plus the public expected accident costs). As a result, the patentee will select a level 
of care that minimizes the private cost of the patent accident but not necessarily the public cost. 
Both a negligence rule with a contributory negligence defense and a comparative negligence rule 
                                               
193 One interesting example of such damages recalibration can be found in William Lee and A. Douglas Melamed, 
Breaking the Vicious Cycle of Patent Damages, 101 CORNELL L REV, 385 (2016) (arguing that damages need to be 
reformed in various ways because of the inability in many fields to preclear patents). As a result of this, and similar 
proposals on patent damage reforms, see e.g. Golden, supra note 00, this Article is assuming that courts are capable 
of adjusting damages roughly in proportion to the positive externality. An alternative assumption and analysis was 
made in Bracha & Goold’s work on Copyright Accidents, supra note 17 at 1051-56. 
194 See e.g. 35U.S.C. §284 (“the court shall award . . . damages adequate to compensate for the infringement . . . in 
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer . . . .” ).  For criticism, see 
Ted Sichleman, Purging Patent Law of ‘Private Law’ Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 516 (2014). See also John, 
Principles for Patent Remedies 86 TEX. L REV 505 (2010). 
195 See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff’s Windfall From Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992). 
196 See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2005). 
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has the same unfortunate outcome.  
Strict liability with a contributory negligence defense is arguably the best rule for 
internalizing third-party externalities. The patentee must take reasonable care to avoid being held 
contributorily negligent. The standard of reasonable care can be adjusted to reflect public 
externalities caused by the patented invention (the cost of care are increased) or on the user’s side 
(the cost of precaution is increased). Assuming the patentee takes due care, the user is then held 
strictly liable, and the damages can be changed to reflect either the value of the user’s or the 
patentee’s technical activity for society. Unlike a simple strict liability rule, however, this does 
not yield a windfall problem. In order to receive a liability award, the patentee must take 
reasonable care to avoid the accident. Thus, if a patentee were to take less than optimal care in 
the hope of claiming large damage awards, they would receive no damage award at all.  
D.  Summary 
Table 6 summarizes the discussion from Sections B and C. Analyzing the table reveals 
not only that some form of negligence rule is preferable to a strict liability rule, but also that the 
optimal liability rule is either a simple negligence rule, or a strict liability rule with a contributory 
negligence defense. After discussing these options, this Section concludes with some additional 
considerations that, in this author’s view, tip the scales in favor of a simple negligence rule.  
 
Table 6: A summary of primary and secondary considerations 
 User Care Patent 
Owner 
Care 
Externalities 
Internalized 
Administrative 
Cost 
Error Cost 
No Liability Not 
Optimal 
Optimal No None None 
Strict Liability  Optimal Not 
Optimal 
User Internalizes Moderate Moderate 
Simple 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal User Internalizes Moderate Moderate 
Strict Liability + 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal Owner + User 
Internalizes 
Moderate High 
Negligence + 
Contributory 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal User Internalizes High High 
Comparative 
Negligence 
Optimal Optimal User Internalizes High High 
 
 Some version of a negligence liability rule is preferable to either a strict liability or no 
liability rule because such a rule generates incentives for bilateral care. As this is the primary 
consideration and most important value, strict liability and no liability can easily be rejected as 
inappropriate liability rules. On the other hand, both comparative negligence and negligence with 
a contributory negligence defense also provide incentives for bilateral care, but each come with 
high error and administrative costs; these two liability rules can therefore be easily rejected 
because of the secondary considerations.  
 The best option is therefore either a simple negligence rule or a strict liability plus 
contributory negligence defense liability rule. Both of these rules encourage the technology user 
and the patent owner to take cost-justified precautions to avoid the accident occurring, and thus 
are likely to limit social cost.  On the most important criterion, these rules perform equally well. 
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It is therefore down to secondary considerations to help determine which rule is preferable. 
However, the secondary considerations do not provide a clear winner. The most important 
secondary consideration, activity levels, is unhelpful in this context, as the activities of both the 
patent owner and the technology user affect the probability of accidental infringement 
approximately equally. The remaining secondary considerations cut in different directions: while 
a strict liability plus contributory negligence rule involves higher error costs than negligence rule, 
such a rule also seems better placed to internalize third party positive externalities associated with 
the technical activity.  
 Although both rules have a legitimate claim to optimality, three additional considerations 
tip the scales in favor of a simple negligence rule. First, from the discussion in part II, it emerged 
that the contemporary patent accidents problem is caused significantly by patent owners taking 
less than optimal care. As the discussion of “notice failure” highlighted, the current patent system 
does not provide sufficient incentives for the patentee to provide full ownership information to 
the public.197 On the other hand, there is very little suggestion that the patent accident problem is 
the result of users taking less than optimal care.198 Therefore, while an optimal liability rule ought 
to ensure both parties have the right incentives, there is reason to believe that increasing the 
incentives for the patent owner is comparatively the most important goal. A simple negligence 
rule is preferable to strict liability plus contributory negligence rule from this perspective. 
Crucially, a simple negligence rule makes the patent owner the residual bearer of the harm, 
whereas strict liability plus contributory negligence makes the user the residual bearer of the 
harm. As a result, under a strict liability rule with contributory negligence defense, the patentee 
will only take the precautions necessary to conform to the due care standard. Under a negligence 
rule, the patentee will internalize the value of any additional cost-effective precautions that are 
not accounted for in the negligence standard (such as activity levels or any other non-foreseen 
variables). This is desireable in the contemporary environment where the patentee’s lack of 
incentives for care are a comparatively significant contributor to the accident problem.  
 Second, a negligence rule is preferable in situations where the patentee and user select 
their levels of care sequentially.199 In many situations, the patentee has the opportunity to select 
the level of care before the technology user. The patentee has the opportunity to decide whether 
to attach markings to a product, and in what form, and how to write the patent specification. Only 
later does the user decide how much time they will invest in searching for the patentee. Under a 
strict liability plus contributory negligence rule, this may lead to less than optimal incentives for 
the user. If the patentee is contributorily negligent and if the user can see this ex ante, then the 
user may fail to take reasonable care (knowing that any accidents which do occur will be attributed 
to the patentee’s carelessness). For example, if a patentee fails to attach notice to a product, a 
user, upon inspecting the product, may decide not to spend any further time searching for the 
patentee, even though doing so would help reduce accident costs, because the user accurately 
predicts that, if they do infringe a patent, they will not be held liable on account of the patentee’s 
contributory negligence. On the other hand, under a negligence rule, the user would still have the 
incentive to conform to the due care standard. 
 The third concern is litigation costs. So far, we have assumed that the strict liability and 
negligence rules lead to moderate administrative costs because while strict liability is easier for 
                                               
197 Supra notes 85-88. 
198 Some anecdotal evidence to the contrary suggests that some firms instruct their employees not to read patents, in 
the hope of avoiding intentional infringement of patents, although doing so increases the risk of accidental 
infringement. See, e.g., Edwin H. Taylor & Glenn E. Von Tersch, A Proposal to Shore Up the Foundations of 
Patent Law that the Underwater Line Eroded, 20 HASTINGS COMMS & ENT L.J.. 721, 737 (1998) (“As matters now 
stand many companies discourage employees from reading patents. This presumably lessens the chance that the 
company will be found to have knowledge of a patent. However, this defeats the basic purpose of the patents [sic] 
laws, dissemination of information.”);  However, unlike the scale of the problems presented by notice failure, 
which are empirically well-documented, see Bessen & Meurer, supra note 8, the scale of the problem of such 
deliberate shielding is not empirically well-grounded. Furthermore, under a negligence rule, the incentives for such 
behavior may be limited. Rather than instruct employees to refrain from reading patents, companies would be 
better served by employees being aware of neighboring patents and taking reasonable precautions to avoid 
infringement, as this would provide a complete defense. 
199 On sequential decision making to the choice of liability rule, see Landes & Posner, supra note 159, at 76-77, 
and Shavell, supra note 34, at 15 n.14.  
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judges to apply than a negligence rule, the strict liability rule leads to more infringement cases 
which need to be resolved. However, we have also explored the possibility that limiting the 
overall volume of patent infringement cases would minimize costs, even if the complexity of 
some litigation would increase.200 Extending that line of analysis further, my hunch is that a 
simple negligence rule would not only be less costly than a strict liability rule, but would also be 
less costly than a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory negligence defense. This 
suspicion flows from a problem of information asymmetries. If a simple negligence rule is 
imposed, users can avoid litigation (or alternative dispute resolution) by responding to 
infringement allegations simply by stating what level of care they have taken. However, users do 
not have the same option necessarily under a strict liability plus contributory negligence rule. In 
many cases, users will not know what level of care the patentee has taken (especially if the 
patentee’s level of search was negligent). Often this information will only come out into the open 
at trial. As a result, without this information, many users will need to go to trial to establish the 
contributory negligence defense, whereas they would not need to do so to prove their lack of 
negligence. If this is true in a substantial amount of cases, administrative costs would be lowest 
if a simple negligence rule were to be adopted.  
 IV.  Implementing Negligence 
 Part III demonstrated that either a simple negligence rule or a strict liability rule 
accompanied by a contributory negligence defense minimizes the social loss associated with 
patent accidents. Furthermore, Part III concluded with a number of reasons for preferring a simple 
negligence rule. This Part accordingly turns to issues of implementation. Section A examines two 
legal regimes in more detail – the U.S. and U.K. – and asks: How closely do these current legal 
regimes approximate the ideal liability rule? It demonstrates that the U.K. regime comes closer 
to the ideal regime because U.K. law denies damages in cases where the defendant did not know 
nor had “reasonable grounds” for supposing that the patent existed.201 Armed with these insights, 
Section B proposes a “patent negligence” defense. In accident cases, defendants ought not be held 
liable when they have taken reasonable care to avoid the accidental infringement. Section C 
illustrates how this rule would apply to a range of accidental infringement cases. 
A.  Existing Legal Regimes 
We shall first turn our attention to U.S. patent law (which may be described as a “quasi-
contributory negligence regime”), and thereafter to U.K. patent law (which may be described as 
a “quasi-negligence regime”).  
1. U.S. Patent Act 
Under current U.S. law, one who accidentally infringes a patent will be held strictly liable. 
Typically, the patent holder is awarded damages and an injunction.202 However, there is an 
exception in Section 287 of the Patent Act.203 This section states that “patentees, and persons 
making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented article” may give notice 
to the public of the patent by attaching the word “patent” and the patent number; if such marking 
is not given, then the patent holder will not receive damages unless they have given the infringer 
actual notice (but will still receive an injunction).204 The purpose of this marking requirement was 
introduced to reduce the frequency of inadvertent patent infringement.205  
However, the marking requirement has been interpreted narrowly by courts.206 In 
                                               
200 Supra note 180-81 and accompanying text. 
201 See infra notes 219-221. 
202 35 USC 283-4. 
203 35 USC 287. 
204 35 U.S.C. §287. 
205 Wine Ry. Appliances Co. v. Enterprise Ry. Equip. Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398 (1926) (the purpose of patent 
marking is to provide “protection against deception by unmarked patented articles, and requires nothing 
unreasonable of patentees”); Motorola, Inc. v. United States v. 729 F.2d 735, 772 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“a fundamental 
rationale supporting section 287 is supplying notice to prevent innocent infringement.”). Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard 
tire co., 704, f.2D 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ([t]he purpose of this provision is to give patentees the proper 
incentive to mark their products and thus place the world on notice of the existence of the patent.”). 
206 See Blair & Cotter, supra note 12, at 840-45; Chiang, supra note 11, at 43-9. 
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particular, the requirement only applies in cases where the patentee produces products.207 As a 
result, the marking “duty” does not apply in cases where the patentee does not produce a product. 
Therefore, as interpreted by courts, there is no duty to mark nor give notice in cases where the 
patent covers a process rather than a product.208 Furthermore, there is no marking duty in cases 
of idle or non-commercialized patents (that is, patents relating to products, but where the patent 
holder does not commercially market any products).209 These types of patents – both process and 
idle patents – are particularly relevant in the context of patent assertion entities (or patent “trolls”). 
Patent assertion entities by definition do not produce any products, and therefore are under no 
marking duty; their revenue instead flows from licensing the patented technology. In these cases, 
there is currently no marking duty, and accordingly this business model encourages patent 
accidents.  
How does the U.S. liability regime compare to the ideal negligence rule? To answer this, 
it is helpful to split the cases into two groups: those where the marking duty does not apply, and 
those where the marking duty does apply. In the former, the liability regime is a straightforward 
strict liability rule: damages and injunctions are awarded regardless of the level of care either 
party has taken to prevent the accidents occurring. On the other hand, in cases where the marking 
duty applies, the liability rule comes close to a strict liability rule accompanied by a contributory 
negligence defense. That is, the user will be liable unless she can demonstrate that the patentee 
was contributorily negligent in failing to provide appropriate notice.  
Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the current liability regime governing cases 
where the marking duty applies differs from that of a standard contributory negligence rule. First, 
the contributory negligence defense is implemented using rules rather than standards. Legal 
theory demonstrates how the same legal directive can be implemented in a variety of more or less 
precise ways.210 For example, in order to encourage drivers to drive at a reasonable speed, a legal 
rule could be drafted using a vague and flexible standard (i.e. drivers must drive “reasonably”), 
or alternatively, a more precise and more rigid rule could be adopted (i.e. drivers must drive under 
30mph). The benefits and costs of each regime are discussed in detail in a voluminous 
literature.211 Typically, when legal scholars discuss contributory negligence, they make reference 
to a contributory negligence rule drafted using standards (i.e. the defendant will be liable unless 
the plaintiff failed to take “reasonable care”). However, in Section 287, the contributory 
negligence standard is not drafted using a vague and flexible standard, but instead using a bright 
line rule: the patentee will be contributorily negligent if she failed to appropriately mark the 
product or provide the user with actual notice.212  
Second, and more significantly, even if the plaintiff is contributorily negligent, they may 
still be awarded an injunction. This is unusual for a negligence rule. As Calabresi and Melamed 
demonstrated, “property rules” (i.e. entitlements protected by injunctive relief) are appropriate in 
cases where the parties can bargain ex ante.213 This allows the market to allocate goods to the 
actors that value them the most. However, where transaction costs prevent ex ante bargaining, 
then a liability rule ought to be imposed, i.e. injunctive relief ought to be denied and damages 
imposed.214 The question thereafter becomes what type of liability rule ought to be imposed: strict 
liability or some form of negligence liability rule? As highlighted by others previously, patent 
accidents involve cases where ex ante bargaining cannot take place, and therefore a property rule 
is unhelpful, and a liability rule ought to be imposed.215 This current Article is concerned with the 
next step of the analysis and suggests a negligence rule is preferable to a strict liability rule. 
However, the current Section 287 rule is a hybrid in that it denies damages when the patentee was 
                                               
207 Wine Ry. Appliances Co., 297 U.S. 387, 398. 
208 Supra note 206. 
209 Id.  
210 See generally, Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, (1992); Isaac 
Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974).  
211 Id. 
212 Id. 
213 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
214 Id. at 1105-10. 
215 Supra note 15. 
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contributorily negligent, but nevertheless allows the patentee to receive an injunction. 
Presumably, this difference can be explained on the grounds that after a court has found 
infringement, the transaction costs between the user and the patentee are reduced: the user now 
knows whom to contact to license the technology.216 Therefore, while the court should impose a 
negligence liability rule for past conduct, future conduct ought to be treated as non-accidental and 
thus governed by a property rule to encourage effective market transactions.  
Yet this reasoning leaves much to be desired. In many instances, injunctive relief will lead 
to a “hold-up” problem.217 Frequently by this point, the technology user will have built a business 
around the use of the technology, and therefore not be in a position to easily carry on business 
without it. There is a substantial chance that technology users who become accidental infringers 
will become “locked in” and be unable to change their business to avoid the patent infringement. 
In such circumstances, injunctive relief allows the patentee to shut the user’s business down, 
unless the user pays a very high licensing fee (i.e. above the rate that the user would have paid if 
they had truly bargained ex ante). To illustrate, in the RIM v NTP case, NTP’s injunctive relief 
enabled them to extract a $613 million license fee from RIM.218 The potential for receiving a 
highly lucrative injunction in turn distorts the incentives for patentee care: by taking less than 
optimal care, they may lose the possibility of obtaining damages, but may increase their ability to 
receive an injunction which may be even more profitable. Thus the presence of ex post injunctions 
threatens the very goal the law should achieve, i.e. that both parties take an appropriate level of 
care to prevent accidents ex ante.  
2. U.K. Patent Act 
Like the U.S., liability for accidental infringement in the U.K. is imposed strictly. But also 
like the U.S., damages will be refused in some cases. Section 62 of the Patent Act 1977 states that 
no damages will be awarded against a defendant who was not aware of the infringement “and had 
no reasonable grounds for supposing” that the patent existed.219 If a patented product contains the 
word “patent” and the relevant patent number, then the user shall be deemed to have reasonable 
grounds for supposing the patent existed.220 Courts have held that the “reasonable grounds” test 
is objective, and in many cases compared it to the “reasonable person” negligence standard.221  
Recent cases illustrate the rule’s scope. In Collingwood Lightning Ltd v Aurora222, the 
patentee produced a fire-resistant LED downlight. The defendants alleged they had no grounds 
to know of the patent, but the court disagreed: the patented product had been featured in a trade 
magazine (as the magazine’s “Innovative Product of the Year”) with wide circulation, and which 
was frequently read by the defendant’s technical staff.223   
In contrast, the defense was successfully argued in Micromatic A/S.224 In this case, the 
claimant produced a patented valve coupling to stop valves in pressurized containers (e.g. beer 
kegs) from “shooting out” when removed.225 Crucial to the functioning of the invention was a 
“lower pin”.226 However, the patent did not explain the function of this lower pin.227 After the 
function of the lower pin was established at trial, the court held that the patent was invalid for 
lack of novelty and inventive step.228 But the court went one step further and stated that had it 
                                               
216 This reasoning was implicit in the Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 case, where the 
court focused not on the initial potentially accidental infringement, but instead on what actions Schmeiser ought to 
have taken after having found the patented seeds on his farm land. 
217 See generally, Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 1991 
(2007). 
218 Supra note 5. 
219 Patent Act 1977, s.62 
220 Id.  
221 See e.g. Schenck Rotec GmbH v Universal Balancing Ltd [2012] EWHC 1920 (Pat) (“The facts known to 
Universal Balancing at the time were not such that would lead a reasonable person to think the patent existed.”). 
222 [2014] EWHC 228 (Pat). 
223 Id.  
224 [2001] 5 WLUK 209 (Ch D (Patents Ct)) 
225 Id.  
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
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found the patent valid, it would nevertheless have not awarded damages because, in not 
explaining the functioning of the lower pin, the patent was not drafted with “reasonable skill and 
knowledge” and thus the defendants had no reasonable grounds for supposing they infringed the 
patent.229  
Finally, in Schenck Rotec v Universal Balancing, the plaintiff produced a device and a 
method for fixing balancing weights to a rotor.230 The defendants was a competitor in the 
market.231 The claimant alleged infringement in 2010 and the defendants claimed Section 62 
applied.232 Schenck argued that the defendants ought to have performed a search of the patent 
register; they argued that there were only four significant players in the propshaft balancing 
industry and that all other incumbents patented their inventions. However, the judge disagreed.233 
The judge found that the “possibility for new developments in this field is limited”234, and that 
the defendants had not seen the patentee’s brochures or literature describing their product as 
“patented”.235 As a result, the court found that the facts known to the defendants “at the time were 
not such that would lead to a reasonable person to think the patent existed” and nor “would these 
facts lead a reasonable person to think they should conduct patent searches” to see if their product 
infringed a competitor’s patents.236  
 The U.K. provision is best described as a “quasi-negligence” rule where the burden of 
proof is on the defendant to prove their lack of negligence. Unlike the U.S., courts are directed to 
examine the user’s level of care rather than the patentee’s. In cases where the patentee markets 
products, there is an additional evidentiary rule: if the patentee attached appropriately notice the 
court may infer the defendant behaved negligently. But, unlike the U.S. provision, the negligence 
rule is not limited to these cases, and accordingly, the rule is broader in scope than Section 287 
of the U.S. Patent Act. The negligence rule applies to all forms of accidental patent infringement 
and not merely infringement of patented products. However, like the U.S. law, injunctions are 
still routinely awarded to restrain future activity. 
 In sum, both the U.K. and U.S. law already adopt some mechanisms to encourage bilateral 
care, and in this sense approximate some form of negligence rule. However, both legal regimes 
implement that negligence rule imperfectly. Armed with this insight, we can turn to reform 
proposals.   
B.  A Patent Negligence Defense 
This Article recommends that countries dealing with the problem of patent accidents adopt 
some version of a “patent negligence” defense.237 Implementing such a rule would require courts 
to first determine whether the infringement was accidental or not. This would require the judge 
to consider the ex ante position of the defendant. If a reasonable person would have foreseen that 
the planned conduct would almost certainly infringe a patent, the infringement should be classed 
as intentional, and subject to the normal procedures (including supra-compensatory damages for 
willful infringement). In these cases, nothing need change. On the other hand, if the court 
determines that a reasonable person would only have foreseen a substantial risk that the planned 
conduct may amount to a patent infringement, then courts ought to apply a negligence rule. Courts 
in these cases should be directed to assess whether the technology user adopted all reasonable 
care to mitigate the risk, using the Learned Hand formula as a guide to determining whether a 
given precautionary measure was reasonable or not. If a defendant is deemed to have failed to 
take all reasonable care available, then the defendant ought to be held liable for damages. If, 
however, the defendant did take all reasonable care, then the defendant ought to be held not liable, 
and subject to neither damages nor injunction. 
This proposal recommends implementing a negligence rule via legal standards rather than 
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a more precise set of rules. Courts ought to have a broad discretion to consider the whether the 
defendant adopted all “reasonable” precautionary measures in the circumstances. The alternative 
would be to define a set of precise rules which approximate the negligence determination, e.g. the 
defendant must be found negligent if she failed to search the patent registry. The pros and cons 
of such rules are well-established in the literature.238 While proxy rules provide more legal 
certainty, their inflexibility frequently leads to over- and under-inclusiveness.239 For example, 
courts could adopt a rule that any user who fails to perform a search of the patent register will be 
considered negligent. However, such a rule is over-inclusive: it holds liable those who fail to 
search when it would not be reasonable to do so (such as the defendant in Schenck).240 The rule 
would also be under-inclusive: some users would be held not liable for infringement on the 
grounds that they searched the register, even though they failed to take some alternative care 
measure which may have been cost-justified in the circumstances (e.g. inspecting products for 
patent information).  
A good example of the potential for over- and under- inclusiveness in this area comes 
from contemporary U.S. law. Section 287 was drafted to encourage patentee care and prevent 
accidental infringement.241 But it is under-inclusive in that the rule does not encourage patentee 
care from those who hold patents on processes or non-commercialized products, and it is over-
inclusive in exempting from liability defendants who have not infringed accidentally (i.e. those 
who knowingly infringe but are shielded from damages because the patentee has failed to provide 
appropriate notice). While this over- and under-inclusivity could theoretically be resolved by 
creating an even more fine-grained set of rules, I am unconvinced this would be an efficient 
approach to legal design. As demonstrated in Part II, the situations in which accidental patent 
infringement occurs are highly heterogenous, and accordingly accidental infringement, like 
accidents in other parts of tort law, is a problem best solved by increasing judicial discretion to 
apply a flexible standard.242  
Nevertheless, rules will still play a part in the patent negligence defense. Courts 
undoubtedly will over time formulate evidentiary rules that indicate when a user has behaved 
negligently.243 This will increase certainty incrementally to an appropriate level. A starting point 
should be the example in contemporary U.K. law. In cases of patented products, courts should 
adopt an evidentiary rule that if the patentee has attached the word “patent” and a patent number, 
then the defendant is presumably negligent. This, however, ought to take the form of a rebuttable 
presumption. If the defendant can prove that, despite the existence of the patent information 
marking, that they took all reasonable care, then they nevertheless ought not to be held liable.   
The proposed defense is an affirmative defense. The burden of proof falls on the user to 
establish the defense once a prima facie case of infringement has been established. While clearly 
a change to patent doctrine, this would provide the simplest and least intrusive intervention into 
the existing system. Under this proposal, most patent cases would remain unaltered: in non-
accident cases, patent cases would proceed as they currently do. Indeed, in many accident cases, 
there would be very little change: many defendants who do not have the required evidence to 
prove reasonable care are more likely to reach a settlement, rather than attempt defense. The only 
cases that would change are those in where the defendant has a plausible argument that they 
adopted all reasonable care.  
As will be recalled from Part II.C., a number of authors raised concerns about the 
feasibility of adopting a negligence rule. At this point, we can see how adopting a patent 
negligence affirmative defense would avoid or mitigate those concerns. Blair and Cotter argue 
that the administrative costs of a negligence rule are too high.244 The first, and most important 
response, to this concern is that the administrative costs of strict liability are already very high: 
strict liability leads to large numbers of infringement claims which would not reach court under 
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a negligence liability rule.245 Given the Bessen and Meurer findings on the explosion of patent 
litigation in recent years due to the number of infringement claims, the claim that that strict 
liability is administratively less costly than a negligence rule invites questions.246 Furthermore, 
not only will those administrative costs be mitigated by the doctrine of stare decisis, but these 
“extra” costs will only apply in a subset of patent infringement cases, namely accident cases.  
Similarly, Robert Merges defends strict liability on two grounds.247 First, Merges argues 
that that proving “copying” would be costly for patent holders.248 But, while there is certainly 
truth in Merges’s concern, this Article does not make such a proposal. Instead, the Article 
proposes that the defendant avoid liability by proving they took reasonable care to prevent 
infringement. Accordingly, the legal costs for the patent holder will not be significantly altered. 
Secondly, Merges argues that if knowledge of the patent was a pre-condition for patent 
infringement, then technology users will have an incentive to shield their research staff from 
technology subject to a patent, in order to avoid those researchers from copying patented 
material.249 However, in the vast majority of cases, shielding researchers will not qualify as a 
“reasonable” precautionary measure. Indeed, as Merges highlights, the costs of shielding in terms 
of lost knowledge transfer will be great, and the benefits in terms of reduced accident prevention 
will often be slight.250 Accordingly, a defendant who fails to adopt such shielding tactics would 
not be deemed negligent. As a result, innovative companies would not have an incentive to take 
such inefficient measures.  
By far the best way for such a rule to be implemented would be through legislation. Ideally 
the legislator ought to enact a provision stating that in cases of accidental infringement, the 
defendant will be subject to compensatory damages and an injunction if she has failed to take all 
reasonable care. The legislation should then further define an infringement as accidental if, prior 
to performing the technical activity, the defendant could not establish with reasonable certainty 
whether the technical activity would be infringing behavior or not. The legislation should also 
establish the Hand Formula as the test for whether a precautionary measure is reasonable or not. 
In the U.S. an ideal place for this defense would be Section 271 of the Patent Act, which currently 
defines infringement (proposed subsection i.).251 Likewise, in the U.K. Section 62 (on the 
“Meaning of Infringement”) would serve as an appropriate destination.252  
Alternatively, courts could also take the lead implementing a negligence rule. In the U.K., 
this would require only a modest change in practice. The law already directs the court to deny 
damages in cases where the defendant behaved reasonably.253 The only additional step required 
would be for courts to deny injunctions in the same cases. Currently, while routinely awarded, 
injunctions will be denied in certain cases, such as where the injunction would be oppressive on 
the defendant.254 In cases where the defendant could not be certain of the infringement ex ante, 
and has taken the care of a reasonable person in ascertaining the status of the technology, it would 
be oppressive to award an injunction and thereby threaten to shut down a socially desirable 
business. Moreover, article 3(2) of the EU Enforcement Directive requires that remedial measures 
be imposed on the basis of their proportionality, amongst other things.255 Denying the injunction 
in such cases would arguably be proportional to the user’s level of culpability.  
In the U.S., courts would need to adopt a more interventionist approach. Unlike the U.K., 
in many cases, the liability standard in the U.S. is strict, and only in some cases is a contributory 
negligence defense partially adopted.256 Yet, the Patent Act does not at any point state that the 
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liability for patents must be strict.257 The question of fault in patent law has long been a judicial 
decision. Lynda J. Oswald demonstrates in her history of patent infringement that U.S. courts 
adopted strict liability for patent infringement in the nineteenth century.258  Courts and early 
treatise writers argued that patents were a form of property and imported concepts into patent 
from property law, including the strict liability infringement rule.259 This rule was upheld by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Hogg v Emerson in 1850 and has remained part of patent law ever since.260 
When Congress revised statutory patent law, there was little questioning of whether accidental 
infringement ought to be strict or fault-based.261 Courts today retain the authority to modify this 
judicially-created rule. Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have the authority 
to hold that a defendant only be held liable for negligent accidental infringements of patent rights. 
Therefore, in the absence of Congressional action, courts could find that in accidental 
infringement cases, a defendant who proves that she has taken all reasonable care, is not within 
the definition of an infringer, and thus not liable. Section 287 would thereafter layer over this 
basic liability rule. The underlying liability rule would be negligence, and Section 287 would 
provide an evidentiary rule that, in cases of products, a defendant is taken to be liable if the 
patentee attached appropriate marking to the product. 
C.  Illustrative Applications 
Having proposed the introduction of a “patent negligence” defense, this Section considers 
how such a defense would apply in certain high profile accident cases. In particular, the cases of 
NTP v RIM, Rambus v Infineon, and Monsanto v Schmeiser will be examined. These cases are 
selected because together they illustrate how the negligence rule would apply to a number of areas 
of contemporary concern in patent law: patent thickets, patent trolls, strategic behavior, and self-
replicating technologies. The analysis shows how these are not isolated problems facing the patent 
system, but instead are the emanations of a deeper, more significant, accident crisis that remains 
unaddressed. 
1. NTP v RIM: Patent Thickets and Patent Trolls 
As previously highlighted, the NTP case is illustrative of the problems caused by patent 
thickets, particularly in the smartphone sector, and is further interesting because the plaintiff was 
a non-practicing entity.262 How would such a case be analyzed under this Article’s proposed 
negligence rule? To answer that question we must ask: Did RIM take all reasonable measures to 
avoid the infringement? In other words, did RIM behave negligently? Or were there any 
precautionary measures that NTP could have adopted which would have helped avoid this 
particular accident?  The following section tentatively sketches the argument that RIM did not 
behave negligently. However, this conclusion is tentative. As will be seen, whether RIM behaved 
without due care is a difficult question, with finely balanced arguments on either side.  
What precautionary measures were available to RIM to prevent the Blackberry’s 
infringement of NTPs patents? One obvious precautionary measure would be to complete a search 
of the patent register. Under normal circumstances searching the patent register is a reasonable 
precautionary measure and one we would expect technology users to perform. In most cases, the 
benefit of searching the register will far outweigh the cost doing so imposes: the reduction in 
expected accident costs will often be great compared to a relatively modest cost. From my 
investigation into the case, I cannot find evidence that RIM did in fact perform a patent search. 
Assuming that they did not, then we normally would conclude that RIM failed to take all 
reasonable precautions for preventing the accident. 
However, the RIM case is not an ordinary one. In this case, it is conceivable that 
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performing a patent search would have been largely ineffective due to the existence of a patent 
thicket. As highlighted earlier, the smartphone sector is one which suffers heavily from the 
existence of multiple overlapping patents. 263 Accordingly, the ability for RIM to find all of the 
relevant patents through searching the register would have been very low indeed. If RIM 
attempted to find all the relevant patents, it would require a very significant amount of investment 
of time and labor into the searching process. Before RIM produced the Blackberry, therefore, 
their option was to perform a costly patent search that was likely to yield little marginal benefit 
in terms of reduction in expected accident costs (as demonstrated by the fact that when the USPTO 
searched the register during RIM’s later patent application, it too did not uncover NTP’s patent). 
This may explain why RIM seemingly did not perform the search. As we have seen, under a strict 
liability rule, the user has an incentive to take cost-justified precautionary measures. This 
precautionary measure was arguably not cost-justified and thus it is little surprise it was not 
taken.264 Accordingly, Bessen and Meurer conclude that it was likely inefficient for RIM to 
perform such a search.265  
Was searching the register the only possible precautionary measure? Perhaps not. In 
January 2000, NTP sent RIM a letter explaining their belief that RIM were infringing their 
technology.266 This arrived 16 months before NTP initiated a patent infringement suit in 
Virginia.267 How ought a reasonable company respond to such a letter? Upon receiving an 
infringement notice, it is arguable that a reasonable precautionary measure would be to hire patent 
attorneys to analyze the claims made by the patent holder, and determine whether there was 
indeed any infringement. It is not clear, however, whether RIM adopted such measures. At trial, 
some evidence was introduced to suggest that RIM had carefully considered the claims; while 
other evidence was presented that RIM ignored the letter.268 Assuming the letter was ignored, was 
that evidence that RIM failed to take all reasonable precautions? Perhaps. Although the argument 
could also be made that such letter arrived after RIM had commenced the patent infringement. 
By this point, the Blackberry device was being sold commercially. It is conceivable that analyzing 
the claims made in the letter would have imposed a cost on RIM which, due to the timing of the 
letter, would not have helped prevent the infringement in the first instance.  
On the other hand, what, if anything could NTP have done to prevent the infringement? 
Most importantly, NTP could have informed RIM of their patents before RIM started selling the 
Blackberry. To demonstrate this point, we need some context surrounding the introduction of the 
Blackberry. From 1995 to 1999, there were only a handful of producers selling pagers 
incorporating wireless technology: Motorola, US Robotics, Nokia, and RIM.269 After becoming 
a publicly traded company on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 1997,270 RIM entered this market 
with the production of the Inter@ctive 900 two-way Pager which allowed users to send and 
receive messages over the internet via a wireless data network known as Mobitex.271 This product 
was commercially successful, and in 1997 was named the Top Product by “Wireless for the 
Corporate User” magazine.272 This was just one in a string of high publicity awards. Between 
                                               
263 Supra note 79-80 and accompanying text. 
264 An interesting comparison can be made between the RIM case and the British Schenck case discussed earlier, 
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1997 and 1999 RIM won awards for Excellence in Innovation from the Network Computing 
Magazine, was voted High Technology Entrepreneur of the Year by the Canadian Advanced 
Technology Association, received the Editor’s Choice Award by CNET, the Mobility Award for 
Mobile insights from the Smithsonian, to name just a few.273 During the same time RIM had 
signed wireless handheld supply contracts with American Mobile, IBM, and Rogers Cantel (now 
AT&T).274 The two-way Pager was so successful that by 1998 RIM were concerned about 
copycats producing similar pagers, and accordingly applied for a patent on their wireless 
technology.275 By 1999, the Blackberry was introduced and was already a heavily publicized and 
established product: Business Week called it the close to perfect pocket email, while celebrities 
such as Bill Gates and Pamela Anderson were already adopting it and promoting it.276  
In these circumstances, it would have been reasonable for NTP to inform RIM of their 
patents at an earlier date. NTP was a patent assertion entity, with a very limited number of patents 
related to wireless technology. A reasonable patent holder in these circumstances should consider 
who in the industry may potentially be using their patented technology, and take simple measures 
to ensure that those potential users do not become accidental infringers – especially when, in areas 
affected by patent thickets, it is unreasonable to expect the patent register alone to fulfil this task. 
In this case, NTP only had to keep track of a handful of companies who were potentially infringing 
their patents: those few companies endeavoring to produce wireless email pagers. These 
companies, and RIM in particular, were not hidden from public view. Rather, as the proceeding 
discussion shows, their wireless pagers were very well publicized, and discussed in magazines 
dedicated to wireless technology. In these circumstances, if NTP adopted a little more care in 
monitoring the market and keeping wireless technology producers aware of their patent rights, 
then we would expect to a reduction in the chances of a patent accident occurring. If RIM were 
exculpated from liability, NTP and those similarly situated in the future, would have a clear 
incentive to take these precautionary measures.  
 The conclusion that RIM was not negligent is, however, tentative. Clearly more 
knowledge of the case facts would be necessary to come to a final conclusion. Under the current 
strict liability rule, the court is not obligated to assess the level of care taken by the parties. As a 
result, the court record in the RIM case does not clearly demonstrate the level of care RIM adopted 
nor the variables necessary to determining whether such care was reasonable. Therefore, it is 
possible that the defendant’s level of care was unreasonable. This is particularly true in relation 
to RIM’s failure to search the patent register. If so, then the defendant did indeed behave 
negligently and ought to be subject to a damages award (but not injunction).   
 Crucially however, even if RIM was found to be liable under a negligence rule, this would 
still help create incentives for bilateral care. In the future, parties in RIM’s situation could avoid 
damages by performing a reasonable patent search. Meanwhile, parties in NTP’s situation would 
also take precautionary measures: perceiving the likelihood that most users will perform a patent 
search and thus be found non-negligent, the patentee will increase their chances of revenue by 
making their ownership information more readily apparent to users.  
2. Rambus v Infineon: Strategic Behavior 
As discussed earlier, patentees can often “benefit from strategically hiding, obfuscating, 
and distorting” information contained in the patent.277 We discussed the Rambus case as an 
example. In this case, Rambus waited until Infineon was “locked in” to using a standards-essential 
patent, before seeking and enforcing new patent claims.278 Only when Infineon adopted the 
SDRAM technological standard did Rambus disclose their new patent claims and bring an 
infringement action.279  
Did Infineon behave negligently? The answer is almost certainly no! Infineon was an 
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active participant in the JEDEC Standard Setting Organization, and responsibly inspected all 
patents which, according to the SSO’s rules, were related to the relevant standards. That included 
inspecting the relevant DRAM patent before making any manufacturing decisions. Having 
responsibly inspected the available patent information, Infineon began manufacturing. Only then 
did Rambus seek further claims, which when later issued, would potentially enjoin Infineon’s 
business. Of course, Infineon could have decided not to manufacture anything on the grounds that 
Rambus – a known patent assertion entity – may potentially seek continuations which would later 
enjoin their production. But such care would clearly have been excessive, resulting in a massive 
opportunity cost for both Infineon and its customers. We can be confident that Infineon, therefore, 
met its duty of care.  
Under a negligence rule, the incentives for this type of strategic behavior would diminish. 
Having adopted all reasonable measures of care, Infineon would not be liable to Rambus. Not 
only would Infineon avoid damages but they would also not be subject to an injunction. The 
consequence is that such strategic claiming would be completely unprofitable for Rambus. The 
financial incentive to secretly seek new claims, and to opportunistically trap the unwary, would 
be completely undercut.  
 
3. Monstanto v Schmeiser: Self-Replicating Technologies 
The Schmeiser case discussed above has generated much academic commentary. In 
particular, writers have questioned whether the defendant ought to have been subject to a strict 
liability rule if, as he claimed, the patented seeds accidentally made their way onto his land 
through cross-fertilization. British treatise writers, Bently, Sherman, Gangjee and Johnson argue 
that in cases farmers “through no fault of their own, may be liable for patent infringement when 
a patented plant ‘invades’ their property”280 and highlight that similar problems could occur in 
relation to other self-replicating technologies, such as genetically modified animals. Similarly, 
Christopher Holman argues that “while strict liability might be acceptable for most technologies, 
the ease with which seeds can spread and reproduce relatively autonomously raises serious public 
policy concerns.”281 But when viewed through the lens of accident law, one sees this is not an 
isolated incident affecting only biotechnology and self-replicating technologies. This is merely 
one instance of the broader phenomenon of accidental infringement. And once again, a negligence 
liability rule would be the appropriate response to such a case.  
Assuming for now, the case was truly one of accidental infringement, both Percy 
Schmeiser and Monsanto could have taken steps to prevent the infringement occurring. Farmers 
in Percy Schmeiser’s position can limit the chances of becoming accidental patent infringers by 
“fencing out” the invading seeds: this involves creating buffer zones, erecting hedges and other 
barriers, and “temporal spacing” i.e. planting crops at different times of year from neighboring 
farms to limit the chance of cross-fertilization, or cleaning rented equipment thoroughly before 
use.282 All of these measures are costly, but do effectively reduce the possibility of an accident 
occurring. 
The patentee can equally take care to avoid the infringement. One famous example in the 
seed context is through employing “Gene Use Restriction Technologies” (GURTs).283 
Genetically modified seeds can be further modified such that the plant’s offspring do not contain 
particular traits conferred by the transgenic seed; as a result, if the seed accidentally blows onto 
another’s land, the resulting progeny are not patent-infringing.284 But the precautionary measures 
at the patent holder’s disposal are not limited to complex technological measures. Like George 
                                               
280 LIONEL BENTLY ET AL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 640 (2018). 
281 Christopher M. Holman, Bowman v. Monsanto Co.: A Bellwether for the Emerging Issue of Patentable Self-
Replicating Technologies and Inadvertent Infringement, 80 MISS. L. REV. 665, 680 (2015). See Also, Siddharth 
Khanijou, Patent Inequity? Rethinking the Application of Strict Liability to Patent Law in the Nanotechnology Era 
12 J. Tech. L. Pol’y 179 (2007). 
282 See generally, Jim Riddle, GMO Contamination Prevention: What Does It Take? (University of Minnesota) 
available at https://www.demeter-usa.org/downloads/GMO-Contamination-Prevention.pdf. 
283 See e.g. Yi Sang et al, Gene Use Restriction Technologies for Transgenic Plant Bioconfinement, 11 PLANT 
BIOTECH. J. 649 (2013).  
284 Id.  
2019/05 
 
46 
www.city.ac.uk/law 
 
 
Selden and the Model T, simply publicizing the nature of the risk to farmers would help.285 
Farmers such as Schmeiser can only adopt effective precautionary measures if they are aware of 
the risk, and the patent holder can make this danger clearer through publicity. Likewise, the patent 
holder can also “fence in” the travelling seeds by erecting appropriate windbreaks or barriers. The 
patent holder could contribute financially to such initiatives or contractually require that users of 
their patented seeds do so as a condition of use.  As a result, moral philosopher Zoë Robaey argues 
that the duty to prevent such contamination is not to be borne entirely by the farmer, nor entirely 
by the patent holder, but that there is a “collective, or joint, imperative to act responsibly to limit 
or avoid contamination” through such cross-pollination.286 
How would adopting a negligence rule affect incentives in the Schmeiser case? Once 
again, the main difference would be that such a rule would create incentives for appropriate care 
on the patentee side. Under a strict liability rule, Schmeiser already faced incentives to adopt 
reasonable preventative measures. This would remain the case under a negligence rule. This is 
not only appropriate, but provides a better solution than simply exculpating all “passive 
infringers”. We should expect farmers in Schmeiser’s position to adopt reasonable measures. 
Failure to do so should result in the farmer bearing partial responsibility for the accidental 
infringement. But equally, farmers who do take reasonable measures to avoid the infringement 
ought to be exculpated, thus shifting part of the responsibility back onto the patent owner.   
 V. Conclusion 
Accidental patent infringement is a significant and growing problem. As the number of 
broad and amorphous patents grows, the probability that one will inadvertently infringe a patent 
increases. This Article has argued that, rather than deem all accidental infringers strictly liable, 
we ought to hold such defendants legally responsible only when they have failed to take 
reasonable care to avoid the infringement. Applying theoretical economic models found routinely 
in tort literature, the Article has analyzed the costs and benefits of the various liability rules which 
could apply to patent accidents. While current doctrine holds patentees strictly liable, this Article 
has found that either a strict liability rule with a contributory negligence defense or a simple 
negligence rule would improve social welfare. Accordingly, the Article recommends the 
introduction of a “patent negligence” defense. Defendants should be liable for accidental 
infringement of patents, but only when they have failed to take the care of a reasonable person. 
As Guido Calabresi, in relation to physical injury accidents, pointed out fifty years ago: “Our 
society is not committed to preserving life at any cost.”287 We should not be committed to 
preserving patents at any cost either! 
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